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CONFLICT OF INTEREST TRANSACTIONS: FIDUCIARY
DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS WHO ARE
ALSO CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS
CHRISTA K.M. DE LA GARZA*
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 1978 Colorado joined the increasing number of states which
have enacted corporation codes based on the 1969 edition of the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act.' One of the most important changes effected by the
new code is contained in section 7-5-114.5 of the Colorado Revised Statutes.
2
This section deals with director conflict of interest transactions, and deline-
ates the manner in which such transactions may be validated. 3 The statute
is a legislative attempt to establish uniformity of treatment for conflict of
interest situations and to resolve confusion in the area created by case law.
4
Section 7-5-114.5, however, does not control all possible conflict of inter-
est situations. For example, it does not control the conflict which occurs
* Ms. De La Garza received her J.D. from the University of Denver College of Law in
1979. She is presently associated with the law firm of McGinnis, Lochridge, and Kilgore in
Austin, Texas.
1. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-5-101 to -118 (Supp. 1978) based on Model Business Corp. Act
prepared by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporation, Banking, and
Business Law of the American Bar Association (1969). For jurisdictions which have passed the
same or similar statute, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 607.124 (West 1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-10-5 (Burns 1978); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.34
(1962) (as amended, 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6304 (1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A,
§ 717 (1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1545-.1546 (1973); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2040.01
(1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.60 (Page
1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 57.265 (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7.1.1 to 37.1 (1970); VA. CODE
§ 13.1-39.1 (1975); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-25 (1976); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.355 (West 1972).
2. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5 (Supp. 1978) reads:
Director--Conflicts of Interest. (1) No contract or other transaction between a corpo-
ration and one or more of its directors or any other corporation, firm, association, or
entity in which one or more of its directors are directors or officers or are financially
interested shall be either void or voidable solely because of such relationship or interest
or solely because such directors are present at the meeting of the board of directors or
a committee thereof which authorizes, approves, or ratifies such contract or transac-
tion or solely because their votes are counted for such purpose if:
(a) The fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed or known to the board of
directors or committee which authorizes, approves, or ratifies the contract or transac-
tion by a vote or consents sufficient for the purpose without counting the votes or
consents of such interested directors; or
(b) The fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed or known to the sharehold-
ers entitled to vote and they authorize, approve, or ratify such contract or transaction
by vote or written consent; or
(c) The contract or transaction is fair and reasonable to the corporation.
(2) Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the presence
of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof which
authorizes, approves, or ratifies such contract or transaction. (Added by H.B. 1245, L.
'77, eff. 7-1-78).
3. Id.
4. C. Mauer & Giacomini, The 1977Revisions to the Colorado Corporation Code, 7 COLO. LAW.
911, 918 (1978).
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when a director who is also a controlling shareholder purchases the assets of
the corporation prior to liquidation. This article will analyze to what extent
the new statute controls such a situation and to what extent traditional case
law must be relied upon.
Prior to addressing this specific issue, the general fiduciary duties owed
to a corporation by directors who are also majority or controlling sharehold-
ers will be reviewed. It is also necessary to examine Colorado's historic
conflict of interest rules governing corporate fiduciaries since some are appli-
cable today in conflict of interest situations not covered by statute.
While the Colorado statute is the focal point of this article, the analysis
is equally applicable to other jurisdictions having enacted similar conflict of
interest statutes.
II. GENERAL FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, AND
MAJORITY OR CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS
A. Application of Trust Law to Corporations
It is axiomatic in Colorado, as elsewhere, that directors and officers oc-
cupy fiduciary relationships to the corporation. Moreover, all three - direc-
tors, officers, and the corporation - occupy a fiduciary relationship to the
collective body of stockholders. 5 Colorado courts, in determining the nature
and extent of this fiduciary relationship, have consistently held that directors
and officers are trustees with the corporate assets as the res of the trust and
the stockholders as beneficiaries.6 Therefore, the duties and responsibilites
which are concomitant with this relationship are the same as those a trustee
owes to his trust and its beneficiaries.? One such case, Burchhalter v. Myers, 8
held directors to be trustees on the basis of the corporate statutory law of the
day,9 which used the terms trustee and director interchangeably.' 0 Courts
today could reach the same conclusion for the Uniform Fiduciaries Act de-
fines a fiduciary as both a trustee of an express trust and a director or officer
of a corporation."
5. See, e.g., Whatley v. Wood, 157 Colo. 552, 404 P.2d 537 (1965); Rosenthal v. Four
Comers Oil & Mineral Co., 157 Colo. 136, 403 P.2d 762 (1965); Hudson v. American Founders
Life Ins. Co. of Denver, 151 Colo. 54, 377 P.2d 391 (1963); Morgan v. King, 27 Colo. 539, 63 P.
416 (1900); Great United Corp. v. Great Producers Coop., 41 Colo. App. 34, 588 P.2d 380
(1978); Wright v. Bayly Corp., 41 Colo. App. 313, 587 P.2d 799 (1978); Mosher v. Sinnott, 20
Colo. App. 454, 79 P. 742 (1905). At the federal level, see, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295
(1939); Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972).
6. See, e.g., Whatley v. Wood, 157 Colo. at 558, 404 P.2d at 540 (1965); Kullgren Navy
Gas & Supply Co., 110 Colo. 454, 461, 135 P.2d 1007, 1011 (1943); Morgan v. King, 27 Colo. at
553, 63 P. at 421 (1900); Great W. United Corp. v. Western Producers Coop., 349 Colo. App. at
353, 588 P.2d at 382 (1978); Mosher v. Sinnott, 20 Colo. App. at 456, 79 P. at 743 (1905).
7. Whatley v. Wood, 157 Colo. at 558, 404 P.2d at 540 (1965); Hudson v. American
Founders Life Ins. Co. of Denver, 151 Colo. at 58, 377 P.2d at 395 (1963); Fishel v. Goddard, 30
Colo. at 153, 69 P. at 607 (1902); Morgan v. King, 27 Colo. at 553, 63 P. at 421 (1900); Burns v.
National Mining, Tunnel & Land Co., 23 Colo. App. 545, 130 P. 1037 (1913); Mosher v. Sin-
nott, 20 Colo. App. at 558, 79 P. at 743 (1905).
8. 85 Colo. 419, 276 P. 972 (1929).
9. Colorado Compiled Laws §§ 2263-64, 2267-68, 2270 (1921) (current version at CoLo.
REV. STAT. tit. 7, "Corporations and Associations").
10. 85 Colo. 419, 276 P. 972.
11. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 15-1-103 (1973).
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Frequently, based on this assumption that directors are trustees, Colo-
rado courts have applied trust law to determine the extent of the director's
duty, what constitutes breach of that duty, and the extent of his liability.'
2
The reliance on trust law in dealing with officers and directors is to empha-
size the duty and implied obligations of fidelity owed by them to the corpo-
ration. 13
B. Duties of Good Faith and Undi'vided Loyalty
Among the plethora of fiduciary duties imposed on a director, two of
the most important (and the two most often breached in a conflict of interest
situation) are the duty to act honestly and in good faith and the duty of
undivided loyalty to the corporation. The latter involves the duty to admin-
ister the corporation fairly and solely in the interest of the corporation and
the stockholders, and to communicate to the stockholders and the corpora-
tion all the material facts in connection with a particular transaction which
the trustee knows or shall know.14 In analyzing these two duties, the Tenth
Circuit has held that mere honesty of purpose was not enough to test the
propriety of the directors' conduct since their obligation was fiduciary in
character and not merely to abstain from fraud. The test was expressed as
follows:
The standards of conduct for a trustee rise far above the ordinary
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but a punctilio of
honor, the most sensitive is then the standard behavior required of
a trustee. He must completely efface self-interest. His loyalty and
devotion to this trust must be unstinted. Its well being must always
be his first consideration. 
5
Theoretically, these two duties are separate and distinct. In practical
application, however, they regularly tend to overlap, for a breach of the duty
of good faith invariably involves a breach of the duty of loyalty and vice
versa. Hence, courts, including Colorado courts, have a tendency to discuss
them in the same breath, making it difficult to analyze them separately.
In Colorado, the duties of good faith and loyalty that directors owe to
the corporation and to the stockholders were first enunciated in Kullgren v.
Navy Gas & Supply Co.i6 The supreme court, responding to a transparent
12. Whatley v. Wood, 157 Colo. at 558, 404 P.2d at 540 (1965); Hudson v. American
Founders Life Ins. Co., 151 Colo. at 58, 377 P.2d at 395 (1963); Fishel v. Goddard, 30 Colo. at
153, 69 P. at 609 (1902); Morgan v. King, 27 Colo. at 553, 63 P. at 421 (1900); Glengary Consol.
Mines v. Boehmer, 28 Colo. 1, 62 P. 839 (1900); Wright v. Bayly Corp., 41 Colo. App. at 315,
587 P.2d at 801 (1978); Burns v. National Mining, Tunnel & Land Co., 23 Colo. App. at 550-51,
130 P. at 1039 (1913); Mosher v. Sinnott, 20 Colo. App. at 558, 79 P. at 743 (1905).
13. See Morgan v. King, 27 Colo. at 539; 63 P. at 416 (1900); 3 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 840 (1975).
14. HENN, CORPORATIONS §§ 235-38 (1970); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 170 (1957).
15. United States v. Gates, 376 F.2d 65, 77 (10th Cir. 1967) (relying on Meinhard v.
Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (Cardozo, J.)).
16. 110 Colo. at 454, 135 P.2d at 1007 (1943). In Kulgren, the director and president of a
corporation, along with the other directors, attempted to effectuate an exchange of shares be-
tween the defendant corporation, Navy Gas & Supply Co., and another corporation, The
Grand Co. Eighteen shares of the Navy Gas & Supply Co. were to be exchanged for 50 shares of
The Grand Co., thereby causing The Grand Co. to become a wholly-owned subsidiary. The
1980]
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stock exchange scheme between related corporations, perpetrated solely to
maintain certain directors in their lucrative positions, held:
A director of a corporation is in the position of a fiduciary ...
[H]e owes loyalty and allegiance to his corporation, a loyalty that's
undivided and an allegiance that is influenced in action by no
other consideration other th.n the welfare of the corporation. He
is held in official action, to the extreme measure of candor, unself-
ishness and good faith. Those principles are rigid, essential and
salutory. . . . The directors of a corporation act in a strictly
fiduciary capacity. Their office is one of trust and they are held to
the high standard of duty required of trustees.
17
In addition, directors in Colorado are required to "manage the corpo-
rate affairs in good faith . . . . and give the corporate entity the benefit of
their best judgment and care" and skill and act only in the interest of the
corporation. 18 The directors must also impartially administer the corporate
affairs for the good and benefit of all the stockholders and the corporation.
They therefore have the duty placed upon them not to abridge the rights of
the shareholders either individually or collectively,' 9 and they are held to the
highest degree of honesty.
20
More specifically, Colorado courts have held that directors as trustees
have the following duties: (1) not to profit at the expense of the corporation
or stockholders, 2 t (2) not to speculate with corporate property 22 or use cor-
porate property or their relation to it for personal gain, 2 3 (3) not to secure a
private advantage through the use of official powers at the expense of the
corporation, 24 and (4) not to deal with corporate property in a personal
problem, however, was that all of the directors of The Grand Co., except for the one proposing
the sale, were the directors of the Navy Gas & Supply Co. With The Grand Co. receiving the 18
shares of the Navy Gas & Supply Co., the directors, combining those shares with the shares they
personally owned, would then have had a majority of the stock of Navy Gas & Supply Co.
under their control, and therefore would be able to maintain their lucrative jobs as directors of
the Navy Gas & Supply Co.
17. Id. at 461, 135 P.2d at 1010 (citing Turner v. American Metal Co., 36 N.Y.S.2d 356,
369). This language was used again by the Colorado Supreme Court in Hudson v. American Foun-
ders Lifef Ins. Co. to establish that the president and director of American Founders had breached
his fiduciary duty by causing to be issued 15,000 shares of American Founders stock worth $2.00
a share and exchanging them for shares of dubious or worthless value of the Texas Adams Oil
Co., of which he was also a director.
18. Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1094 (10th Cir. 1972).
19. Rosenthal v. Four Corners Oil & Minerals Co., 157 Colo. at 145, 403 P.2d at 765
(1965); Kullgren v. Navy Gas & Supply Co., 110 Colo. at 461, 135 P.2d at 1010 (1943); Lay-
bourn v. Wrape, 72 Colo. 339, 343, 211 P. 367, 369 (1922); Wright v. Bayly Corp., 41 Colo. App.
at 351, 587 P.2d at 800 (1978).
20. Rosenthal v. Four Corners Oil & Minerals Co., 157 Colo. at 145, 403 P.2d at 767
(1965); Kullgren v. Navy Gas & Supply Co., 110 Colo. at 462, 135 P.2d at 1010 (1943); Lay-
bourn v. Wrape, 72 Colo. at 343, 211 P. at 369 (1922). See also Monroe v. Scofield, 135 F.2d 725,
726 (10th Cir. 1943).
21. Dunnet v. Am, 71 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1934); Davis v. Pearce, 30 F.2d 85 (8th Cir.
1928); Rosenthal v. Four Corners Oil & Minerals Co., 157 Colo. at 145, 403 P.2d at 766 (1965);
Wright v. Bayly Corp., 41 Colo. App. at 315, 587 P.2d at 800 (1977).
22. Whatley v. Wood, 157 Colo. at 559, 404 P.2d at 538 (1965); Fishel v. Goddard, 30
Colo. at 153, 69 P. at 609 (1902).
23. Wright v. Bayly Corp., 41 Colo. App. at 315, 587 P.2d at 801 (1978).
24. Rosenthal v. Four Corners Oil & Mineral Co., 157 Colo. at 143, 403 P.2d at 766 (1965);
Kullgren v. Navy Gas & Supply Co., 110 Colo. at 462, 135 P.2d at 1010 (1943).
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transaction without the approval of the shareholders. 25 Finally, the Tenth
Circuit has held that a director has the duty not to elevate his interests above
those of the corporation or the stockholders, but instead he must place the
performance of his duties above his personal interests.
26
If a transaction involves the sale of corporate assets, it is a breach of
trust for the director to sell the property at an inadequate price. As trustee,
the director has a "duty to determine the fair value of the trust property
before selling it, and any sale of it for an inadequate consideration measured
against its fair value may be subject to being set aside as constructive fraud
upon proper complaint being made."
2 7
C. Application of Fiduciary Duties to Controlling Stockholders
Fiduciary obligations are not confined solely to directors and officers.
Majority, dominant, or controlling stockholders are also said to occupy a
fiduciary relationship to the corporation and to the minority stockholders.
A "controlling stockholder" as defined by the case law, does not neces-
sarily have to own a majority of the voting stock of the corporation. Rather
he is deemed to be controlling because no other person owns a greater per-
centage of voting stock in the corporation, and therefore, the larger stock-
holder is able to exert considerable influence over the policies and future of
the corporation.28
Even though "controlling stockholder" is an inexact term, it has been
defined as conferring on the corporate stockholder the power to "direct cor-
porate policy," and as endowing him with "considerable patronage."
29
Practical or working control of the corporation exists where a stockholder or
group of stockholders has the power to elect the board of directors because of
ownership of a large block of shares. Such control occurs even though in
terms of aggregate shares outstanding the block constitutes a minority, if the
remaining shares are widely scattered. A stockholder who owns only twenty-
three percent of the voting stock of a corporation will have share control of
the corporation as a practical matter if no other stockholder owns more.
30
The Securities and Exchange Commission defines control as follows:
The term "control" (including the terms "controlling," "controlled
by," and "under common control with") means the possession, di-
rectly or indirectly of the power to direct or cause the direction of
the management and policies of a person whether through the
25. Crymble v. Mulvaney, 21 Colo. 203, 40 P. 499 (1895).
26. United States v. Gates, 376 F.2d 65, 77 (10th Cir. 1967).
27. Whatley v. Wood, 157 Colo. 552, 404 P.2d 537, 541 (1965).
28. Set, e.g., Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962); Perlman v. Feld-
man, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), ceri. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955); Gottesman v. General Motors
Corp., 279 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Insuranshares Corp. of Del. v. Northern Fiscal Corp.,
35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
29. Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. at 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
30. See Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d at 575 (2d Cir. 1962); Perlman v. Feld-
man, 219 F.2d at 174 n.l (2d Cir. 1955); Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. at




ownership of voting securities, by contract or otherwise.
3 1
The case law dealing with the issue of control under the Securities and
Exchange Act have made it clear that "indirect means of discipline or influ-
ence" need not be stock ownership. It may arise from a myriad of factors
including other business relationships, interlocking directorships, and family
relationships. Furthermore, a controlling person need not be the only person
or entity with "direct means of discipline or influence."'32 Federal cases deal-
ing with securities violations further define a controlling person as any per-
son who has the power to control, either directly or indirectly, the direction,
management, and policies of a corporation whether by agreement, owner-
ship, or stock or de facto control of the officers and directors of the corpora-
tion.
33
In federal courts, the two landmark decisions which established that
controlling or dominant stockholders are fiduciaries are Pepper v. Litton,
34
and Southern Paciic Co. v. Bogert.35 Southern Pacific dealt with three interlock-
ing corporations with Southern Pacific Co. dominating Houston & Texas
Central Railroad by electing its directors and officers through a subsidiary
which owned a majority of the Houston & Texas Central Railroad stock. In
1888, the Houston & Texas Central Railway was reorganized with all of its
new stock going to the Southern Pacific Co. The minority stockholders in
this transaction received nothing. In 1913, the minority stockholders
brought suit to have the Southern Pacific Co. declared trustee for them of
stock in the new Houston & Texas Central Railway Co. and for an account-
ing. The minority stockholders brought suit only against the Southern Pa-
cific Co. and not against its subsidiary. The wrong complained of consisted
of not sharing with the minority the proceeds of the common property of
which Southern Pacific Co., through its majority holding, had gained con-
trol. In upholding the federal district court's decision for the plaintiffs, the
Supreme Court stated:
The majority has the right to control; but when it does so, it occu-
pies a fiduciary relation toward the minority, as much so as the
corporation itself or its officers or directors. If through that control
a sale of the corporate property is made and the property acquired
by the majority, the minority may not be excluded from a fair par-
ticipation in the fruits of the sale.
36
Pepper v. Litton37 involved the disallowance by a trustee in bankruptcy of
a judgment obtained by the dominant and controlling stockholder (who was
also president and board member) of the bankrupt corporation on alleged
salary claims. The evidence supported the claim that the dominant stock-
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12(b)-2() (1979).
32. Harriman v. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 372 F. Supp. 101, 105 (D. Del. 1974). See also
Klapmeier v. Telecheck Int'l, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Minn. 1970).
33. Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 558 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978); Kennedy v. Tallant,
[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) § 95779; Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rose, 527 F.2d
880 (3d Cir. 1975); Lanza v. Drexel Co., 479 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1973).
34. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
35. 250 U.S. 483 (1919).
36. Id. at 487-88.
37. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
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holder had obtained the confession of judgment of his salary in the amount
of $33,468.89 and employed other manipulative devices in order to avoid the
payment of a debt on a lease. The Supreme Court upheld the trustee in
bankruptcy's disallowance of the judgment and further held that the bank-
ruptcy court, in allowing or disallowing the claim in issue, was also able to
apply the equitable rules pertaining to fiduciaries because "a director is a
fiduciary. So is a dominant or controlling stockholder or group of stockhold-
ers. Their powers are powers in trust . . . . [f]or that standard of fiduciary
obligation is designed for the protection of the entire community of interests
in the corporation - creditors as well as stockholders."'38
Three major federal court of appeals cases further cemented this princi-
ple in federal corporate law: Perlman v. Feldman,3 9 Zahn v. Transameri can
Corp. ,40 and Seagrave Corp. v. Mount.4t All three cases dealt with transactions
in which the dominant stockholder was interested, and all three relied on the
above-mentioned Supreme Court cases to establish that dominant or con-
trolling stockholders are fiduciaries.
The Tenth Circuit also unequivocally adhered to this position by hold-
ing that "[a] director of a corporation occupies a fiduciary relationship to the
corporation and its stockholders, and a dominant or controlling stockholder
or a group of stockholders occupies a fiduciary relationship to the minority
stockholders.
4 2
Colorado case law is consistent with this position.43 The principle that
majority stockholders have a duty to minority stockholders is by no means of
recent origin in Colorado. In 1900, the Colorado Supreme Court in Glenga.r
Consohdated Mines v. Boehmer44 held that majority stockholders, in certain sit-
38. Id. at 307-08 (citations omitted).
39. 219 F.2d at 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
40. 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
41. 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1934).
42. United States v. Gates, 376 F.2d at 77 (10th Cir. 1967). See Wheeler v. Abeline Nat'l
Bank Bldg. Co., 159 F. 391 (8th Cir. 1908).
43. See Wright v. Bayly Corp., 41 Colo. App. 34, 587 P.2d 799; Security Nat'l Bank v.
Peters, Writer & Christensen Inc., 39 Colo. App. 344, 569 P.2d 875 (1977).
44. 28 Colo. 1, 62 P. 839 (1900). This early litigation involved the Ibex Corporation gain-
ing control of the Glengary Consolidated Mines Company by purchasing a majority of its stock
and electing its directors. Ibex' purpose in securing control of the Glengary Company was to
secure a bond and a lease on Glengary property which adjoined property of Ibex. Ibex secured
a contract of this nature on its own terms and conditions through the directors it had elected.
The court held the transaction void and in doing so, said:
Ordinarily, the majority of the stockholders of a corporation have the right to control
its affairs, but this right is limited to the legitimate exercise of the corporate powers.
Among these is the management of the affairs of the corporation through its proper
representatives and officials in the interest of all shareholders. Meeker v. Winthrop Iron
Co., 17 F. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1886) rev'd 122 U.S. 635 (1887). No combination of stock-
holders of a corporation less than the whole will be permitted to manage or control its
affairs in their interest alone. Minority stockholders cannot be deprived of their rights
by such a combination [of majority stockholders] under the guise of a policy of the
corporation dictated by the majority. So far as the rights of the minority are con-
cerned, the majority, in furtherance of their plan to reap a benefit to themselves
through a transaction in which the minority do not participate, become the corpora-
tion itself, and assume the trust relation occupied by the corporation towards its stock-
holders.
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uations, occupy the position of trustee not only toward the corporation but
also toward the remaining stockholders.
The current leading Colorado case in this area is Security National Bank v.
Peters, Wrter, & Christensen Inc. ,45 which involved an alleged breach of fiduci-
ary duties by the corporate directors against the preferred shareholders. The
action complained of was the refusal of the directors to redeem the preferred
shares of the stockholders even though they had already made the decision to
dissolve. Additionally, the preferred shareholders were not notified of the
stockholder meeting at which the decision to dissolve was made nor given
the opportunity to vote on the proposition nor given an opportunity to file
written objections or demands for the payment of the fair value of their
shares as required by statute. 46 The directors did not wish to redeem the
preferred shares because to do so would have required selling certain stock
which the directors believed would increase in value. Interestingly, any such
increase in value would inure only to the benefit of the common stock share-
holders (the directors), for the preferred shareholders were limited by the
articles of incorporation to receiving a fixed amount upon liquidation plus
accumulated and unpaid dividends. In holding the directors' failure to re-
deem their preferred stock as constructively fraudulent and a breach of
fiduciary duty, the court stated:
Further, we note that together the four directors (including the
third party defendant) owns 64,000 shares of the common voting
,stock. This was a substantial amount when contrasted to the total
outstanding of 96,000 voting shares. Thus, in addition to the
fiduciary duties they owed as directors, they also owed fiduciary
duties to the preferred stockholders because of their dominant and
controlling stock ownership.4 7
These fiduciary duties were not imposed on controlling or majority
stockholders by virtue of their influential stock ownership alone. On the
contrary, the majority rule holds that a dominant or majority stockholder
does not become a fiduciary for other stockholders unless he steps out of his
role as a stockholder and begins to "usurp the functions of the director in the
management of corporate affairs."'48 The stockholder must assert active in-
fluence in control of corporate affairs in order to be deemed a fiduciary. The
mere fact that a stockholder owns twenty-three percent of the stock "and is
considered to be controlling and influential because no other stockholder
owns an equal or greater percentage" and by the use of that stock elects
several of its nominees as directors is not enough to make him a fiduciary
when the directors so elected act independently of the stockholder.
49
If a dominant or majority stockholder does undertake to control the
45. 39 Colo. App. 344, 569 P.2d 875 (1977).
46. COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-5-13 (1963) (now COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-112 (Supp. 1978)).
47. 39 Colo. App. at 352-53, 569 P.2d at 881 (1977). As recently as September 1978, the
Colorado Court of Appeals reaffirmed the principle that "[tihe directors of a corporation and its
controlling stockholders also owe fiduciary duties to the remaining stockholders." Wright v.
Bayly Corp., 41 Colo. App. 313, 587 P.2d 799 (1978).
48. Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. at 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
49. Id. See also Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d at 173 (2d Cir. 1955); Harriman v. E.I.
DuPont DeNemours & Co., 372 F. Supp. 101 (D. Del. 1954).
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corporation by dominating the corporation's transactions and management
through a board of directors which he has elected, or if the majority stock-
holder becomes a director or officer, then he is said to also be a trustee.
50
Although it is not clear to what extent Colorado will impose fiduciary
duties on a passive controlling or majority stockholder, Colorado law is con-
sistent with the majority rule that dominant or majority stockholders who
are also directors or who also undertake to control the destiny of the corpora-
tion are held to the same fiduciary duties as directors and officers when vot-
ing such majority or controlling interest. 5 1 In Glengag ConsohdatedMihes the
Colorado Supreme Court specifically held:
In arranging the price and terms for this property the Ibex Com-
pany was acting for itself and not for the interest of the Glengary
Company. Ostensibly the contract was by the latter, but, in fact, it
was one which the Glengary Company was compelled to accept at
the instance of the Ibex Company . . . . [B]eing in control of the
affairs of that company for this very purpose it [the Ibex Company]
occupied the relation which that company did to its stockholders,
ie., their trustee. The subject-matter of this contract was the prop-
erty of which it was trustee and in which the shareholders of Glen-
gary Company, including the minority, were interested as cestui
que trustent.
52
Due to the fact these controlling stockholders are equated to directors or
officers, they are then, in all of their corporate actions, held to the same high
standard of good faith, undivided loyalty, and fairness. For example, they
are trustees both in their actions as directors and in their actions as share-
holders. 53 The applicable standard that the dominant stockholder is held to
in these situations, in most jurisdictions, is one of absolute good faith, includ-
ing the requirements that the stockholder dedicate his uncorrupted business
judgment to the sole benefit of the corporation and act in all things of trust
wholly for the benefit of the corporation and stockholders. 54 Like directors
and officers he is also under the duty to protect the corporation's interest and
to avoid exalting his own interests above those of the corporation or its share-
holders. He cannot use his power for his personal advantage to the detri-
ment of the stockholders.
55
The Tenth Circuit has also enunciated a standard of care for dominant
50. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919); Bayliss v. Rood, 424 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1970); Perlman v. Feldman,
219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1965); Mount v. Seagrave Corp., 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954). See gener-
allv HENN, CORPORATIONS § 240 (2d ed. 1970).
51. Glengary Consol. Mines v. Boehmer, 28 Colo. at 4, 62 P. at 839-40 (1900) (corporation
which gained majority control of another corporation elected dummy directors in order to se-
cure a lease for certain valuable corporate property); Wright v. Bayly Corp., 41 Colo. App. 313,
587 P.2d 799 (1978); Security Nat'l Bank v. Writer, Peters & Christensen Inc., 39 Colo. App. at
352-53, 569 P.2d at 881 (1977) (directors were also controlling stockholders).
52. 28 Colo. at 4, 62 P. at 839-40 (1900).
53. Id. at 4, 62 P. at 839-40. See also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Southern Pac.
Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. at 483 (1919).
54. Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d at 176 (2d Cir. 1955).
55. Northway, Inc. v. T.S.C. Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds,
426 U.S. 438 (1976); Farber v. Sevan Land Co., 393 F. Supp. 633 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
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stockholders in the case of United States v. Gates.56 The basis of that action
was the transfer of substantial amounts of stock of the Gates Rubber Com-
pany into an irrevocable trust for eighteen to twenty years. The income of
said stock was to be paid to the Gates Foundation, a charitable organization,
with the remainder to go to the lineal descendants of the trustors. The set-
tlors of the trust were two members of the Gates family which owned 9 7.6 %
of the stock of the Gates Rubber Company. The Internal Revenue Service
challenged the transaction, claiming that the settlor should not be allowed a
charitable deduction because of the possibility that the foundation would
not receive any beneficial interest in the stock.5 7 In making this argument
the IRS relied, inter a/ia, on the contention that since the directors of the
corporation and the owners of practically all of the stock were members of
the Gates family, and the trust would ultimately inure to the benefit of the
lineal descendants of the Gates family, the corporation might pass dividends
and accumulate earnings for twenty-one years in order to benefit the remain-
dermen of the trust.58 The Tenth Circuit held this contention to be untena-
ble due to the facts and circumstances surrounding the transfer (such as the
history of the directors to declare and pay dividends, the risk of accumulated
earnings tax, the large reduction in income of the members of the Gates
family each year a dividend was passed). It further held that even though
the determination of whether a dividend would be declared was within the
discretion of the board of directors, that discretion was limited in that it had
to be honestly exercised for the good and benefit of the corporation and its
stockholders. 59 Moreover, the court stated:
Here the members of the Gates family form a dominant group of
stockholders of the corporation, and they and the directors whom
they elect control the corporation. It follows that the directors, in
their official capacity and as members of such dominant group of
stockholders, occupy a fiduciary relationship to the holders of mi-
nority stockholder interests, and that they owe a duty to exercise
their powers as directors with unbending fidelity to their cestuis
que trust and to manage the affairs of the corporation in a way that
will be fair and impartial between the Gates family group, as ma-
jority stockholders, and the foundation and other holders of minor-
ity stock interests and not to the personal advantage of themselves
or other members of the Gates family as to the disadvantage or
detriment of the foundation and other holders of minority stock
interests.
6o
In terms of scope, this standard for dominant or controlling stockholders
is not unlike the rule in California which requires "that the comprehensive
rule of good faith and inherent fairness to the minority in any transaction
where control of the corporation is material properly governs controlling
56. 376 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1967).
57. Set Treas. Reg. 1.10-1(e) (1954).
58. United States v. Gates, 376 F.2d at 76 (10th Cir. 1967).
59. Id. at 77. The court further supported its holding by examining the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the transfer, such as the history of the directors to declare and pay divi-
dends, the risk of accumulated earnings tax, the large reduction of income of the members of the
Gates family each year a dividend was passed.
60. Id. at 77.
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shareholders in this state." 6'
Because fiduciaries occupy positions of trust, it is particularly easy for
them to take advantage of the corporation and its stockholders without be-
ing discovered. For this reason, courts are inherently suspicious of transac-
tions between corporations and their individual directors, and special rules
have developed in these situations to insure that the corporation and its
stockholders are protected.
III. APPLICABLE RULES IN DIRECTOR OR CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER
CONFLICT OF INTEREST TRANSACTIONS
A. Hisorz'cal
There was some confusion in Colorado at one time as to whether trans-
actions between a corporation and its directors, between corporations having
common directors, and between a corporation and an entity in which a di-
rector had a financial interest were void or merely voidable. By far, the
weight of the case law is that these transactions are merely voidable.
Colorado case law divides transactions between a corporation and one
of its directors into three distinct categories: (1) transactions involving cor-
porate property (for example, real or personal property owned by the corpo-
ration, treasury stock or other securities owned by the corporation); (2)
transactions not involving corporate assets, but in which the director still
holds a direct and personal interest (for example, loans by a director to the
corporation, transactions or contracts between the corporation and an entity
in which the director is financially interested, or approval of the director's
salary) and in which the director's presence is necessary to form a quorum
and his vote is needed to effectuate the transaction; and (3) transactions not
involving corporate assets, where there is a quorum of disinterested directors
without the interested director's presence and the transaction is approved by
a majority vote of the disinterested directors.
Colorado courts have held that transactions between a corporation and
one or more of its directors involving corporate property are voidable at the
option of the corporation because of the trust relationship notwithstanding
proof that the director acted in good faith, with fairness, and without fraud;
that he paid as much or more than what the property was worth; or that the
transaction was in the best interest of the corporation. 62 This doctrine has
been applied where the interested director took part in the transaction on
behalf of the corporation, although the corporation was also represented by
other directors or officers and his vote and consent were not necessary. It
also has been applied where he took no part in the transaction on behalf of
the corporation, but was at the time, by reason of his official position, under
a duty to look out for the interests of the corporation. 63 This was the minor-
61. Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 602, 460 P.2d 464, 474, 1 Cal. 3d 93,
112 (1969).
62. Morgan v. King, 27 Colo. at 555, 63 P. at 421 (1900); Glengary Consol. Mining Co. v.
Boehmer, 28 Colo. at 4, 62 P. at 840 (1900); Mosher v. Sinnott, 20 Colo. App. at 458, 79 P. at
743 (1965).
63. See cases cited supra note 62.
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ity position at the time, 64 and the substantive distinction between this type
of transaction and others involving corporate directors was the belief that
corporate directors were the equivalent of trustees, and the corporate prop-
erty was the equivalent of the res of the trust, and the stockholders were the
equivalent of the beneficiaries. 65 Therefore, based on trust law:
A trustee cannot deal with the trust estate in the matter where his
interest would or might conflict with his duty to his ceslui que trust.
In all cases where, without the full knowledge and assent of the
cestui que trust, he has assumed to act in the capacity of a vendor
and vendee, the cestut" que trust may avoid the transaction at his elec-
tion. No question of the fairness or unfairness of such a transaction
can be considered .... 66
Where, however, the cestuis que trust, that is, the stockholders, have
unanimous/f approved a transaction between a corporation and one of its di-
rectors involving corporate property, then the transaction will be upheld as
against the stockholders and creditors so long as it was fair and did not in-
volve any actual fraud. 67 This too is consistent with trust law, which pro-
vides that a trustee may purchase trust property without being liable for
breach of his duty of loyalty if the following conditions are met: (1) the
trustee does not induce the sale by taking advantage of his relation to the
beneficiary or by other improper conduct, (2) the trustee makes full disclo-
sure to the beneficiaries, and finally (3) the beneficiaries are all sui juris and
unanimously consent to the sale.
6 8
In transactions between a corporation and one of its directors which do
not involve corporate assets, but which do require the director's presence to
form a quorum and his vote to effectuate the transaction, the Colorado
courts are divided as to whether the transactions are void or merely voidable.
Clearly, under Colorado case law a director is disqualified from not only
voting personally or by proxy in a transaction in which he had a personal
interest, but also from being counted in order to determine if a quorum was
present. 69 The philosophy behind this rule is two-fold: (1) regarding the
constitution of a quorum, the courts believe that an interested director loses
his character as a director and assumes that of a stranger, and therefore he
64. The majority ofjurisdictions have held that transactions entered into between a direc-
tor and a corporation were valid if entered into with good faith and were fair if the corporation
was represented by a majority of disinterested directors. The transaction was then not voidable
by virtue of the relationship alone. 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 13, at § 931. Where, however,
the interested director's vote was needed to effectuate the transaction, it was voidable at the
option of the corporation without regard to fairness because of the relationship. Id. at § 936.
65. See generally cases cited at note 62 supra.
66. Mosher v. Sinnott, 20 Colo. App. at 459, 79 P. at 743 (1965) (quoting Glengary Consol.
Mining Co. v. Boehmer, 28 Colo. at 3, 62 P. at 839 (1900)).
67. Crymble v. Mulvaney, 21 Colo. 203, 40 P. 499 (1895).
68. A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 170, 170.1, 216 (3d ed. 1967).
69. Irwin v. West End Dev. Co., 342 F. Supp. 687 (D. Colo. 1972) (applying Colorado
law); Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins., 145 Colo. 413, 359 P.2d 665
(1961); Laybourn v. Wrape, 72 Colo. 339, 211 P. 367 (1922); Gold Glen Mining, Milling &
Tunneling Co. v. Stimson, 44 Colo. 406, 98 P. 727 (1908); Steele v. Gold Fissure Gold Mining
Co., 42 Colo. 529, 95 P. 349 (1908); Paxton v. Heron, 41 Colo. 147, 92 P. 15 (1907); Gumaer v.
Cripple Creek Tunnel, Transp. & Mining Co., 40 Colo. 1, 90 P. 81 (1907); Burns v. National
Mining, Tunnel & Land Co., 23 Colo. App. 545, 130 P. 1037 (1913).
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cannot be counted as part of the quorum; 70 and, (2) regarding voting by the
director on the contracts or transactions, the courts have held that "[a] direc-
tor cannot with propriety vote in [si'] the board of directors on a matter
affecting his own private interest any more than a judge could sit on his own
case. .. "71 Moreover,
[t]he relation of a director to the corporation which he represents in
that capacity is fiduciary, and for this reason the law forbids him
from making a contract in which his private interests may conflict
with the interests of his principal. He cannot unite his personal
and representative character in the same transaction.
72
At this juncture, the courts appear to be divided. The most recent Colo-
rado Supreme Court case dealing with this type of transaction, however,
held that a contract between two corporations having common directors or
officers is voidable by nature of the relationship alone, irrespective of fairness,
if the vote of the common member or members is necessary to form a quorum
of the board and to effectuate the contract.
73
This decision differs from two much earlier supreme court cases which
held that if an interested director was necessary to form a quorum any vote
taken by the board of directors approving a suspect transaction was illegal
for want of a quorum and therefore void.
74
Finally, Colorado case law indicates that transactions between a direc-
tor and his corporation, not involving corporate assets, are valid and binding
on the corporation where there is a quorum of disinterested directors who,
by a majority vote, approve the transaction. In Steele v. GoldFissure GoldMin-
ing Corp. ,75 the Colorado Supreme Court held invalid a transaction by the
board of directors fixing salaries for two officers of the corporation who were
also two of the three directors fixing the salary. In doing so, the court stated:
"It is essential that the majority of the quorum of a board of directors be
disinterested with respect to the matter voted upon in order to render it valid
and binding upon the corporation."
76
In Burns v. National Mining, Tunnel & Land Co. ,77 the court held that a
promissory note given by a corporation to a partnership in order to secure a
70. Gumaer v. Cripple Creek Tunnel, Transp. & Mining Co., 40 Colo. 1, 90 P. 81 (1907);
Burns v. National Mining, Tunnel & Land Co., 23 Colo. App. 545, 130 P. 1037 (1913).
71. Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co. of Denver, 145 Colo.
413, 419, 359 P.2d 665, 668 (1961) (quoting Burns v. National Mining, Tunnel & Land Co., 23
Colo. App. at 550, 130 P. 1039 (1913).)
72. Steele v. Goldfissure Gold Mining Co., 42 Colo. at 531, 95 P. at 350 (1908).
73. Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 145 Colo. at 418,
359 P.2d at 668 (adopting the decision of Burns v. National Mining, Tunnel & Land Co., 23
Colo. App. 545, 130 P. 1037 (1973).
74. Gold Glen Mining, Milling & Tunneling Co. v. Stimson, 44 Colo. 406, 98 P. 727
(1908); Paxton v. Heron, 41 Colo. 147, 92 P. 15 (1907). This is due to the doctrine commonly
held by the Colorado courts at that time which stated that the interested director was disquali-
fied by law from being counted as part of the quorum, hence there could be no legal quorum
assembled for the purpose of transacting business unless there were sufficient disinterested direc-
tors to form a quorum without counting the interested director. This is not true today under
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5 (Supp. 1978). See note 80 in/a.
75. 42 Colo. 529, 95 P. 349 (1908).
76. Id. at 532, 95 P. at 350.
77. 23 Colo. App. 545, 130 P. 1037 (1913).
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loan was voidable at the option of the shareholders of the corporation be-
cause two of the four directors present and voting at the meeting authorizing
the note were also members of the partnership. However, the court stated
iter ah'a: "Where . ..a majority of the directors vote in favor of a resolu-
tion in which one member of the board has a personal interest, the resolution
is not invalid by reason of that personal interest."' 78 By having a disinter-
ested board of directors represent the corporation and approve the transac-
'tion, the interests of the cestuis que trust were protected. The interested
director was held not to have violated contract law which requires two per-
sons to form a contract, nor did he violate the law of agency which prohibits
an agent from representing and acting for himself and his principal in a
transaction .
79
B. Scope and Effect of Section 7-5-114.5 of the Colorado Revised Statutes
As noted previously, the enactment of section 7-5-114.5 of the Colorado
Revised Statutes8° and similar statutes in other jurisdictions is a legislative
attempt to resolve the confusion created by the case law. 81 The scope of the
statute, however, is limited to transactions (1) between a corporation and
one or more of its directors, (2) between two or more corporations having
directors or officers in common, and (3) between a corporation and an entity
in which a director has a financial interest. The statute does not address the
problem of majority shareholders entering into transactions with the corpo-
ration nor the problem of a director who enters into a transaction with his
corporation and then ratifies the transaction by his vote as majority share-
holder. Also, it only requires fairness to the corporation and not to the indi-
vidual or minority stockholders.
The purpose of the statute is to establish guidelines for determining the
validity of potential conflict of interest transactions and to eliminate the in-
equities and uncertainties caused by the existing rules while leaving undis-
turbed the power of the courts to deal with such matters under general
equitable principles. 82 The statute will validate, if the prescribed tests are
satisfied, a transaction with interested directors which the common law rules
often made voidable or void.8 3 It disposes of the technical case law rules
related to quorums and voting by allowing an interested director to be
counted in forming a quorum. Additionally, it establishes that the contract
or transaction in which a director is interested is not void or voidable solely
because of the director's interest or solely because he was present and voting
on the transaction at a board of directors meeting, if the director's interest is
disclosed or known to the directors whose authorization is sufficient without
counting the vote of the interested director, or if such interest is disclosed or
78. Id. at 550, 130 P. at 1039. See Gumaer v. Cripple Creek Tunnel, Transp. & Mining
Co., 40 Colo. 1, 90 P. 8 (1907).
79. Morgan v. King, 17 Colo. 539, 63 P. 416 (1900); Crymble v. Mulvaney, 21 Colo. 203,
40 P. 499 (1895); Mosher v. Sinnott, 20 Colo. App. 458, 79 P. 742 (1965).
80. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5 (Supp. 1978).
81. See notes 1 & 4 supra.




known to the shareholders who approve or ratify the contract or transaction,
or if the contract or transaction is fair and reasonable to the corporation.
8 4
Substantively, the statute eliminates the dichotomy between transac-
tions which involve corporate assets and those which do not. Additionally, it
eliminates the requirement (when read in conjunction with section 7-4-
114)85 that a transaction between a corporation and one of its director's in-
volving corporate assets be approved by a unanimous vote of all the share-
holders, by providing that the transaction will not be void or voidable if
approved by a majority of the shareholders (or whatever vote is required by
statute).8 6 Finally section 7-4-114.5 eliminates the prohibition against dual
representation by providing that a transaction will not be void or voidable
even if a director votes on the transaction if it is fair to the corporation.
7
Logically, however, when the statutory guidelines are not met, and
therefore by definition the transaction is unfair, or the transaction has
ramifications not covered by the statute (for example, where a majority
shareholder is ratifying a transaction between himself either as director or as
majority shareholder) or the concern is the fairness of the transaction to mi-
nor', shareholders, then current rules of equity and law will control. 8
The effect of the enactment of section 7-5-114.5 is better understood by
analyzing separately the distinct sections of the statute within the context of
the applicable case law and specific factual situations.
C. Appication of the Statute and Case Law
1. Approval or Ratification by Disinterested Directors
In order to have a valid transaction when one or more of the directors is
personally interested in the sale or contract being considered, the resolution
by the board of directors must either be passed by a vote of the disinterested
directors or the transaction must be ratified by the shareholders with full
disclosure or the transaction must be fair to the corporation.8 9 Section 7-5-
114.5(1)(a) states that the approval by the board of directors of a contract or
a transaction where one of the board of directors is interested in that transac-
tion will not be void or voidable solely because of the relationship or interest
if the relationship or interest is disclosed or known to the board of directors,
and the board of directors approves of the transaction by a vote which is
sufficient for that purpose without counting the votes or vote of the inter-
ested directors or director.
What constitutes a "vote sufficient for that purpose" is defined by sec-
tion 7-5-106 of the Colorado Revised Statutes9° which states that a majority
of the aggregate number of directors of a corporation shall constitute a quo-
84. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5(l) (Supp. 1978).
85. Id. at § 7-4-114.
86. Id. at § 7-5-114.5(1)(b).
87. Id. at § 7-5-114.5(I)(c).
88. Mauer Jr. & Giacomini, The 1977Revirons to the Colorado Corporation Code, 7 CoLO. LAw.
910, 918 (1978).
89. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5 (Supp. 1978).
90. Id. § 7-5-106.
1980]
DENVER LAWJOURNAL
rum for the transaction of business, and the acts of a majority of directors
present at a meeting at which a quorum is present shall be the act of the
board of directors.9 ' This particular statutory provision is consistent with
the prevailing law in a majority ofjurisdictions as well as past Colorado case
law.92 As early as 1907 the Colorado Supreme Court upheld a resolution
acknowledging a debt owed a director for extraordinary services rendered to
the corporation by the director during his tenure as president where only
three of the five directors voted on the resolution (one being absent, the other
being the president who rendered the services). 9 3 The court in doing so
stated: "In ordinary cases, when there is no other express provision, majority
of the whole number of an aggregate body, who may act together, constitute
a quorum, and a majority of those present may decide any question upon
which they can act."' 9 4 In other words, if a corporation had a total of four
directors three would constitute a quorum; and in a meeting where only
three directors were present, two directors would constitute a majority of
that quorum and their concurring votes would be binding on the corpora-
tion.
Of equal importance is the fact that the case law establishing which
directors may be counted in order to constitute a quorum has been substan-
tially changed by the statute. Section 7-5-114.5(2) states that Common or
interested directors may be counted in determining the presence of a quo-
rum at a meeting which authorizes, approves, or ratifies the transaction in
which the director is interested. However beneficial this statute may appear,
it also can have unanticipated adverse effects. As noted previously, section
7-5-106 requires a vote of the majority of directors present at a meeting at
which there is a quorum in order to bind the corporation. Combining that
provision with section 7-5-114.5(2) the result is that if an interested director
is present at a meeting and is counted in order to determine if a quorum is
present and then does not vote, he is in effect counted in the negative for the
purpose of determining whether or not the resolution has been carried by a
majority vote. Thus his presence could cause the resolution to fail. In other
words, if a corporation has four directors (quorum being three) and all four
are present and counted in determining a quorum, and two are interested in
the transaction before the board and do not vote, then the resolution will fail
because the votes of the other two directors do not constitute a majority of
those present at the meeting.
In the same situation, if only three of the four directors are present,
there is still a quorum. Even though one director is interested in the transac-
91. "This provision applies unless the act of a greater number is required by this code or
the articles of incorporation or the bylaws." Id. at § 7-5-106.
92. Se generalli3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 13, at § 419 for case law in other jurisdictions
that are in accord with this principle. Many states resolved this problem by statute. IND. ANN.
STAT. § 23-1-10-6 (Burns 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.34 (West Supp. 1970); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 21-2040 (1970); OR. REV. STAT. § 57.265 (1975); Wis. REV. STAT. ANN. § 180.35
(WEST SUPP. 1979).
93. Gumaer v. Cripple Creek Tunnel, Transp. & Mining Co., 40 Colo. at 11, 90 P. at 84
(1907).
94. Id. (quoting Sargent v. Webster, 54 Mass. (13 Met.) 497 (1847)).
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tion and does not vote, the vote of the other two disinterested directors will
be a majority of the quorum and will be sufficient to bind the corporation.
Nevertheless, in situations where there are not enough disinterested di-
rectors voting on a transaction between the corporation and one or more of
its directors, the transaction will still not be void or voidable merely because
some of the directors were interested, present, and voting if the transaction is
ratified by a majority of the shareholders with full disclosure of the circum-
stances surrounding the transaction or if the transaction is fair and reason-
able to the corporation.
2. Approval or Ratification by Stockholders of Corporation
Section 7-5-114.5(1)(b) 95 provides that a transaction between a director
and his corporation will not be void or voidable solely because the director is
present and votes at the meeting of the board of directors approving the
transaction if the stockholders approve or ratify the transaction by the ap-
propriate vote after full disclosure of the director's interest. This is merely
the codification of the prior general rule in Colorado that voidable acts of
directors and officers, for example, transactions between themselves and
their corporation, can be ratified by the majority of stockholders who are
disinterested in the transaction, and who act in good faith. Thereafter, as
long as the transaction is fair, lacking in actual fraud, and fully disclosed, it
is binding on strangers, the corporation, and the individual stockholders, in-
cluding the nonconsenting minority.
96
The statute does change, however, the requirement that transactions
between a director and his corporation involving corporate property must be
ratified by a unanimous vote in order to be binding.
9 7
Although the statute merely requires disclosure of the director's interest,
the general rule in Colorado and elsewhere is that there must be full disclo-
sure of all of the facts and circumstances of the transaction, the terms of the
contract, and, of course, the director's interest therein, for without full
knowledge on the part of the ratifying general party, the ratification is inef-
fective and void. 98 Furthermore, notice and proxy materials sent to stock-
holders informing them of the meeting at which ratification of the
transaction is to occur must state specifically that the purpose of the meeting
is to ratify the particular transaction, and there must be approval by a spe-
95. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5(1)(b) (Supp. 1978).
96. Mountain States Packing Co. v. Curtis, 86 Colo. 355, 360, 281 P. 737, 739 (1929); see
Swafford v. Berry, 152 Colo. 493, 382 P.2d 999 (1963). See also Pneumatic Gas Co. v. Berry, 113
U.S. 322 (1885); Omaha Hotel Co. v. Wade, 97 U.S. 13 (1877); Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury,
91 U.S. 587 (1875); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968).
97. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-4-115, 7-5-114.5 (Supp. 1978).
98. Hudson v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 151 Colo. at 56, 377 P.2d at 397 (1963)
("ratification can never exist unless it is clearly shown that the party charged with ratification
had full knowledge of all the material facts, and thereafter knowingly accepts and approves the
contract."); Colorado Mangement Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 145 Colo. 413, 359
P.2d 665 (1961); Film Enterprises, Inc. v. Selected Pictures, Inc., 138 Colo. 468, 335 P.2d 260
(1959). See also United Hotels Co. of America, Inc. v. Mealy, 147 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1945); Hill
Dredging Corp. v. Risly, 18 N.J. 501, 114 A.2d 697 (1955); State v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 64
Wash. 2d 375, 391 P.2d 979 (1964).
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cific vote on the transaction rather than a blanket approval. In order to
have a valid ratification the minutes of the meeting, and the proxy material
sent to the shareholders, must show that there was full disclosure of all terms
of the transaction or of the specific and exact terms necessary for an intelli-
gent disposition of the matter (preferably the minutes should reflect a discus-
sion of the transaction also).99
Finally the burden of proving ratification of a voidable contract, where
the shareholder had full knowledge of all the material facts, is on the party
alleging it. °° But the rule appears to be that if there has been a valid ratifi-
cation by a majority of the stockholders who are disinterested in the transaction, the
burden of showing fraud or the unfairness of the transaction is on the one
challenging it. 101
Ratification of transactions, however, which are fraudulent, which cut
off the rights of the minority stockholders, or which are oppressive to the
minority are not binding, and the ratification will not preclude a court of
equity from setting aside the transaction at the instance of an innocent mi-
nority stockholder.' 0 2 This is but a logical requirement that all transactions
between a corporation and one of its directors be fair, regardless of whether
or not there has been ratification. 10 3 Further, this rule is not altered by the
existence of section 7-5-114.5 which states that a contract between a corpora-
tion and one of its directors is not voidable "solely by virtue of" that interest
or his voting on the transaction if the interest is disclosed and ratified by the
stockholders.'o4 The statute makes no provision for validating fraudulent
acts; therefore, the traditional equitable rules apply. Of course, as noted
earlier, a contract which is not fraudulent, but which is voidable for violat-
ing the rule that directors cannot enter into a contract for their own benefit
without the knowledge and consent of the stockholders, may be ratified by
the majority of the stockholders.' 0 5 If there is actual fraud in the procure-
ment of the ratification then it is not valid.' 06
Generally, the effect of a valid ratification by a majority of stockholders
disinterested in the transaction is to render a transaction between a corpora-
99. Hudson v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 151 Colo. at 66, P.2d at 397 (1963). See
generally 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 13, at §§ 983-984.
100. Film Enterprises, Inc. v. Selected Pictures, Inc., 138 Colo. at 468, 335 P.2d at 260
(1959). Seegenerally 3 W. FLETCHER, rupra note 13, at §§ 979-980.
101. Gropper v. North Cent. Tex. Oil Co., 35 Del. Ch. 198, 144 A.2d 231 (1955); Findanque
v. American Marcaibo Co., 33 Del. Ch. 262, 92 A.2d 311 (1952).
102. Kerbs v. California E. Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652 (1952); Findanque v.
American Marcaibo Co., 33 Del. Ch. 262, 92 Ad. 311 (1952); Bloodworth v. Bloodworth, 225
Ga. 379, 169 S.E.2d 150 (1969); Chesapeake Const. Co. v. Rodman, 256 Md. 531, 261 A.2d 156
(1970); Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co., 23 N.J. Super. 431, 92 A.2d 862 (1952), afd, 12 N.J. 467,
97 A.2d 437 (1953); Russell v. Henry C. Patterson Co., 232 Pa. 113, 81 A. 136 (1911). See
generally 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 13, at § 983.
103. Rosenthal v. Four Corners Oil & Minerals Co., 157 Colo. 136, 403 P.2d 762 (1965);
Swafford v. Berry, 152 Colo. 493, 382 P.2d 999 (1963). See also Remillard Brick Co. v. Remil-
lard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952); Bloodworth v. Bloodworth, 225
Ga. 379, 169 S.E.2d 150 (1969).
104. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5 (Supp. 1978).
105. Swafford v. Berry, 152 Colo. 493, 382 P.2d 999 (1963); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5
(Supp. 1978); see Pollitz v. Wabash Ry., 217 N.Y. 113, 110 N.E. 721 (1912).
106. Mountain Packing Co. v. Curtis, 86 Colo. 335, 281 P. 737 (1929).
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tion and one of its directors binding. Neither the corporation, individual
stockholders, nor strangers can later sue to set it aside or otherwise attack its
validity without showing actual fraud and unfairness. 7
Special rules apply when the interested director is also the majority or a
controlling stockholder. None of the cases analyzed dealt with a controlling
stockholder; instead all dealt with majority stockholders who had a personal
interest in the transaction. However, if the traditional rules concerning rati-
fication do not apply because there is not a disinterested majority of stock-
holders voting due to the majority stockholders' interest, it is logical to
assume that they would not apply where the resolution calling for ratifica-
tion of a particular issue is only passed by counting the votes of an interested,
controlling stockholder.
There is of course nothing to deprive a stockholder from voting on any-
thing that properly comes before the stockholders on account of a personal
interest in the transaction.' 0 8 The general rule is, however, that such a ratifi-
cation is not binding on the minority, nonvoting stockholders; the director or
stockholder will still have the burden of proof to show that the transaction
was fair.109 Naturally, a director cannot effectively ratify as a stockholder
his own acts as director which are fraudulent, a breach of fiduciary duty, or
oppressive to the minority stockholders. 1 10
Regardless of whether a transaction is ratified by disinterested share-
107. Swafford v. Berry, 152 Colo. 493, 382 P.2d 999 (1963); Mountain Packing Co. v. Cur-
tis, 86 Colo. 355, 281 P. 737 (1929). See generall Dimpfell v. Ohio & Miss. Ry., 110 U.S. 209
(1884); Pneumatic Gas Co. v. Berry, 113 U.S. 322 (1885); Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91
U.S. 587 (1876); Eastern Okla. Tel. Co. v. Ameco, Inc., 437 F.2d 138 (10th Cir. 1971); Pappas v.
Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Bloodworth v. Bloodworth, 225 Ga. 379, 169 S.E.2d 150
(1969).
108. See, e.g., Hodge v. United States Steel Corp., 64 N.J. 807, 54 A. 1 (1903); Beutelspacher
v. Spokane Say. Bank, 164 Wash. 227, 2 P.2d 729 (1931); Thurmond v. Paragon Colliery Co., 82
W. Va. 49, 95 S.E. 816 (1918); cf. Mountain Packing Co. v. Curtis, 86 Colo. 355, 281 P. 737
(1929) (the interested director voted his shares, but the court unheld the transaction relying on
the fact that there was a majority of shareholders who approved the transaction without his
vote).
109. See, e.g., Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968) (where a majority of a corpora-
tion's shares were held by the directors interested in effectuating a sale of capital stock to them-
selves, there could be no effective ratification at least in the sense that it transferred to the
attacking stockholders the burden of showing fraud. The stockholders could sue derivatively
and the directors had the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that the transaction
was fair, honest and reasonable.); Sarner v. Fox Hill, Inc., 151 Conn. 437, 199 A.2d 6 (1964)
(holding that a director voting as the sole stockholder present at the meeting ratifying the board
of directors' actions transferring shares of treasury stock to him as compensation for managerial
services did not preclude an attack by a minority stockholder on such a transaction nor absolve
the director/stockholder of the burden of proving that payment for such shares was fair and
reasonable compensation); Klein v. Independent Brewing Ass'n, 231 11. 594, 83 N.E. 434 (1907)
(directors who sold property to corporation at a price that was $16,575 greater than the market
value could not prevent a director suit to set aside the transaction by nonconsenting stockholder
for they could not procure a ratification of the transaction by resolution); Chesapeake Constr.
Corp. v. Rodman, 256 Md. 531, 261 A.2d 156 (1970) (asserted ratification would not bar a court
of equity from setting aside a transaction whereby the director of the corporation sold property
to the corporation at a cost several hundred thousands of dollars over the market price, when
said director also owned 75% of the stock ratifying the transaction). See generally 3 W. FLETCH-
ER, supra note 13, at §§ 761, 764, 933.
110. See Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Chesapeake Constr. Co. v. Rodman,
256 Md. 531, 261 A.2d 156 (1970); Bloodworth v. Bloodworth, 225 Ga. 379, 169 S.E.2d 150
(1969); Klein v. Independent Brewing Ass'n, 231 I11. 594, 83 N.E. 434 (1961).
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holders or by counting the votes of an interested director or stockholder,
those shareholders who vote to affirm a transaction involving a director or
controlling stockholder after a full disclosure are estopped to attack the
transaction, either individually or derivatively."' Swa,rd v. Berry is the
most current Colorado case in this area. In that transaction four incorpora-
tors/directors (a father and three sons) transferred a business and its assets to
a corporation in exchange for 10,000 shares of the corporation's common
stock. These four directors then owned the majority interest in the corpora-
tion, and two other directors of the corporation owned 2,500 shares."l 2 The
transfer was ultimately challenged by the minority stockholders who alleged
that the defendants had breached their fiduciary duties. The court first es-
tablished that full disclosure of the facts and circumstances of the transaction
had been made by the interested directors to the stockholders and that the
transaction was fair to the corporation. The court then stated with regard to
the plaintiff's ability to bring the suit:
Stockholders' suits on behalf of a corporation are entertained only
in equity . . . and equity has always demanded certain minimum
standards of those who seek relief in its forum. Thus we find the
general rule that a shareholder who, with knowledge of the mate-
rial facts, has consented or acquiesced in the transaction of which
he complains ordinarily cannot attack the transaction on behalf of
the corporation . . . . By purchasing their shares in the corpora-
tion after being fully apprised of the details of the transaction
... . the plaintiffs consented to or acquiesced in the transaction.
We are led to the inescapable conclusion that these plaintiffs had
no standing to obtain the relief they sought here.
113
It is important to note that stockholders are not only estopped to com-
plain about a director's voidable transactions which they have ratified or
acquiesced in, but they also are estopped to complain about ultra vires or
unauthorized acts of directors in which stockholders have acquiesced.
1 14
Furthermore, not only are the stockholders who acquiesce in or ratify voida-
ble transactions estopped, but also their transferees are estopped to challenge
the transaction except where the transfer occurred by operation of law.' IS
Nevertheless, if an interested director is unable to secure a ratification of
his action by an independent board of directors or by the stockholders, his
transaction with the corporation will still be valid if it is fair to the corpora-
tion, as provided for by the law paragraph of section 7-5-114.5.16
111. See Swafford v. Berry, 152 Colo. 493, 382 P.2d 999 (1963); Gallup v. Pring, 108 Colo.
277, 116 P.2d 202 (1941); Boldenweck v. Bullis, 40 Colo. 253, 90 P. 634 (1907) ("Stockholders
who vote in favor of a transaction and their transferees cannot maintain suit on behalf of the
corporation and other stockholders to avoid the transaction"). See generally W. FLETCHER, supra
note 13, § 5862; see also Morse Gen. Tires, Inc. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 128 F. Supp. 74
(W.D. Okla. 1954); Bloodworth v. Bloodworth, 225 Ga. 379, 169 S.E.2d 150 (1969).
112. 152 Colo. at 494-98, 382 P.2d at 1000-01.
113. Id. at 499-500, 382 P.2d at 1002 (1963).
114. See Gallup v. Pring, 108 Colo. 277, 116 P.2d 202 (1941).
115. Langlois v. B. F. Merchant Inv. Co., 101 Colo. 438, 73 P.2d 1385 (1937); Boldenweck v.
Bullis, 40 Colo. 253, 90 P. 634 (1907); Gumaer v. Cripple Creek Tunnel, Transp. & Mining Co.,
40 Colo. 1, 90 P. 81 (1907).
116. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5 (Supp. 1978).
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3. Requirement of Fairness
The gravamen of the test of the validity of conflict of interest transac-
tions in corporate law is fairness. Unless a transaction between a corporation
and one of its directors is ultimately fair, it will not withstand later attack
even though all the technical rules are met." 
7
Section 7-5-114.5 specifically states that a transaction between a direc-
tor and his corporation will not be void or voidable solely because of that
interest or solely because the interested director was present and voted at the
meeting approving the transaction if the transaction is fair to the corpora-
tion. "18 The technical requirements of ratification by the shareholders or by
a disinterested board of directors do not have to be present in order to make
the transaction valid; however, the converse is not necessarily true. By com-
plying with section 7-5-114.5(l)(a) and (b) which requires full disclosure of
the director's interest and approval by either a majority of disinterested di-
rectors or the stockholders, an interested director is still not relieved of his
duty to act fairly toward the corporation and its stockholders. On the con-
trary, the case law construing statutes similar to Colorado's holds that even if
there has been full disclosure and ratification by the directors and stockhold-
ers, the transaction will still be voidable if found to be unfair to the corpora-
tion and the stockholders. 19
Remllard Brick Co. v. Dandt'nni Co. 120 is one of the leading cases in this
area. The board of directors of the Remillard-Dandinni Company consisted
of three directors, two of whom controlled the majority of voting stock by
proxies given to them by the stockholders, and they also had a contract with
the stockholders to buy the majority interest. The third director was the sole
stockholder of the Remillard Brick Company, the minority stockholder of
the Remillard-Dandinni Company. The two controlling directors devised a
plan whereby the Remillard-Dandinni Company would form a wholly-
owned corporation to handle exclusively the promotion and sales of all the
products manufactured by the Remillard-Dandinni Company and another
wholly-owned manufacturing company. The sales company used almost ex-
clusively the facilities and equipment of the manufacturing companies, and
the two directors received salaries from both corporations.
During litigation, in response to the minority shareholder's allegation
that the contracts between the sales corporation and the manufacturing cor-
porations were unfair, the two directors argued that since the fact of the
common directorship of the sales and manufacturing company was fully
117. Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66
(construing a statute similar to the Model Business Code Annotated § 41); cf. Colorado Man-
agement Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 145 Colo. 413, 359 P.2d 665 (holding that
even if a transaction in which a member of the board is interested is approved by a majority of
disinterested directors, it will still be set aside if after strict scrutiny it is found to be unfair).
118. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5 (Supp. 1978).
119. See, e.g., Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241
P.2d 66 (1952); cf. Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1950) (applying Michigan
law); Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Joanna W. Mills Co., 53 I1. App. 3d 542, N.E.2d 629 (1977)
(applying Delaware law). Se genera/ly W. FLETCHER, supra note 13, § 919.
120. 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952).
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known to the boards of the contracting corporations and because the major-
ity stockholders had consented to the transaction, they were therefore in
compliance with section 820 of the California Corporation Code' 2 1 and the
minority stockholders had no legal right to sue. Section 820 was substan-
tially identical to Colorado's section 7-5-114.5 in that it provided that con-
tracts between directors and their corporations or between corporations
having common directors would not be void or voidable on that basis if the
shareholders by a majority vote had approved the transaction after full dis-
closure. The California Court of Appeals held that argument to be untena-
ble and stated:
[N]either § 820 of the Corporations Code nor any other provision
of the law automatically validates such transactions simply because
there has been a disclosure and approval by the majority of the
stockholders. That section does not operate to limit the fiduciary
duties owed by a director to all the stockholders, nor does it operate
to condone acts which, without the existence of a common director,
would not be countenanced. That section does not permit an of-
ficer or director, by abuse of his power, to obtain an unfair advan-
tage or profit for himself at the expense of the corporation. The
director cannot, by reason of his position, drive a harsh and unfair
bargain with the corporation he is supposed to represent. If he
does so, he may be compelled to account for unfair profits made in
disregard of his duty. Even though the requirements of § 820 are
technically met, transactions that are unfair and unreasonable to
the corporation may be avoided.
1 22
This interpretation would, in all probability, be the one enforced in
Colorado based on past Colorado case law which has held that a transaction
between a director and his corporation must be fair in order to withstand
later attack, notwithstanding the fact that there has been approval by a ma-
jority of a quorum of disinterested directors, or acquiescence in or ratifica-
tion by the stockholders.' 23 It also appears to be an interpretation the
Colorado courts would readily adopt given past Colorado case law holding
any transaction between a corporation and one of its directors involving cor-
porate assets voidable without regard to the fairness or the good faith of the
contract.
Section 7-5-114.5 also embodies the majority rule of American courts
which holds that transactions between directors and their corporations are
valid if they are open and above board, free from any taint of fraud, actual
or constructive, entered into honestly and in good faith, and fair and if the
director can show he has secured no advantage at the expense of the corpora-
tion.12 4 The statute, however, is limited to the requirement that the transac-
121. CAL. CORP. CODE § 820 (West 1947).
122. 109 Cal. App. 2d at -, 241 P.2d at 74 (1952).
123. See Swafford v. Berry, 152 Colo. 493, 382 P.2d 999 (1963); Colorado Management
Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 145 Colo. 413, 359 P.2d 665 (1961); Laybourn v.
Wrape, 72 Colo. 339, 211 P. 367 (1922).
124. See, e.g., Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921); Pappas v.
Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Monroe v. Scofield, 135 F.2d 725 (10th Cir. 1943) (which
held that if dealings between a corporation and one of its directors are honest and to the benefit
of the corporation they are as valid as transactions with a stranger); Richland v. Crandall, 262
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tion be fair to the corporation. The case law expands on that requirement
and requires that the transaction not only be fair to the corporation but also
to those interested therein, for example, the other stockholders. Because the
case law expands the requirements of section 7-5-114.5 rather than being
superseded by it, this equitable principle will continue to apply in transac-
tions between directors and their corporations. 1
25
As noted earlier, section 7-5-114.5 does not treat the situations where
the majority stockholder is contracting with his corporation. However, the
case law in this area indicates that the rule for transactions between a corpo-
ration and its majority or controlling stockholders is the same as the rule for
directors and officers if the stockholders are ones who can be deemed
fiduciaries. Therefore, a controlling or majority stockholder who is engaged
in self-dealing with his corporation must prove the transaction scrupulously
fair, in good faith, free from actual fraud, and not oppressive to minority
stockholders or the corporation. 1 26 Once again, meeting the technical re-
quirements of disclosure will not protect a majority or controlling stock-
holder from having his transaction set aside if found to be unfair. Again
quoting from Remtllard Brick Co.:
It would be a shocking concept of corporate morality to hold that
because the majority directors or stockholders disclose their pur-
pose and interest, they may strip a corporation of its assets to their
own financial advantage, and that the minority is without legal
redress. 127
Nevertheless, where a stockholder or director makes a contract with the
corporation which a stranger might make, and the contract is fair, the trans-
action is as valid as if it were between the corporation and the stranger. This
is so even if the stockholder or director owns a majority of the stock.128
There is authority that a majority stockholder cannot make a contract
with his corporation so long as he is also acting as an officer or agent of the
corporation or so long as the directors are his puppets. This rule results from
F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1950) (applying
Michigan law); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d
66 (1952); Bloodworth v. Bloodworth, 225 Ga. 379, 169 S.E.2d 150 (1969); Brundage v. New
Jersey Zinc Co., 48 N.J. 450, 266 A.2d 585 (1967). See generally W. FLETCHER, supra note 13,
§§ 949, 931, 919; HENN, supra note 14, § 467. It also appears to be the rule in Colorado at the
time COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-5-114.5 (1973) was enacted. See Rosenthal v. Four Corners Oil &
Minerals Co., 157 Colo. 136, 403 P.2d 762 (1965); Swafford v. Barry, 152 Colo. 493, 382 P.2d
999 (1963); Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 145 Colo. 413,
359 P.2d 665 (1961).
125. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining
Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955); Seagrave Corp. v.
Mount, 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947);
Jones v. H.R. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 2d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969); Swafford
v. Berry, 152 Colo. 494, 382 P.2d 999 (1963).
126. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. at 306 (1939); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173
(2d Cir. 1955); Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Jones v.
H.F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969); Remillard Brick
Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952). See general[y W.
FLETCHER, supra note 13, §§ 5737, 5781, 5834.
127. 109 Cal. App. 2d at -, 241 P.2d at 74 (1952).
128. Monroe v. Scofield, 135 F.2d 725 (10th Cir. 1943); Geominerals Corp. v. Grace, 232
Ark. 524, 338 S.W.2d 935 (1960). See generally W. FLETCHER, supra note 13, §§ 5737, 5781.
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the prohibition against dual representation; that is, a person cannot be both
buyer and seller in the same transaction, and therefore a majority stock-
holder cannot authorize, through his vote on the board of directors or
through his control of the directors by his majority interest, a sale to himself
as buyer even if the transaction is in good faith. 129 Colorado's only case on
majority stockholders contracting with their corporations is Glengagy Consoli-
dated Mines Co. v. Boehmer decided in 1900.130 In this case the Colorado
Supreme Court held that the Ibex Corporation was merely contracting with
itself for it had complete control of the Glengary Company (which was at
Ibex's "mercy" in the language of the court). Ibex had secured control of the
stock of Glengary Company for the purpose of electing its own puppet direc-
tors to the corporation in order to contract with Glengary in its own interest.
The Colorado Supreme Court held the transaction void. 131 This case, how-
ever, does not have precedential value for several reasons. First, it is a 1900
case and now clearly in opposition to the weight of authority concerning
these types of transactions, including section 7-5-114.5 governing contracts
between corporate officers and directors personally and their corporation.
Second, since directors and majority or controlling stockholders are
fiduciaries to the same beneficiary it would be illogical and inconsistent to
apply a stricter rule to stockholders than to directors. Third, the use of the
word "void" in the case appears to be a mistake; what the court intended to
mean was that the transaction was voidable.
132
As noted earlier the weight of authority in Colorado is that these types
of transactions between a director and his corporation are voidable. It
would be unlikely in light of that rule that the courts would hold the same
type of transaction void merely because the contracting party is a stock-
holder not a director when both are considered to be a fiduciary of the same
nature. Following this line of reasoning, even though there are no current
Colorado cases in this area, due to the fact the Colorado courts consider
directors and certain controlling or majority stockholders to be corporate
fiduciaries and hold them to the same levels of good faith and loyalty, it
would be logical to hold majority or controlling stockholders to the same
standard as directors in conflicts of interest situations, that is, compliance
with section 7-5-114.5 and the case law regarding the requirements of fair-
ness. In so doing Colorado would also be in accord with the weight of au-
thority in most other jurisdictions.
129. See, e.g., Chicago Hansom Cab Co. v. Yerkes, 141 Ill. 320, 30 N.E. 667 (1892); Crichton
v. Webb Press Co., 113 La. 167, 36 So. 926 (1904) (which held that if a stockholder undertakes
to discharge the functions of director and conduct affairs of the corporation, he becomes subject
to the same trust relation which precludes directors from contracting with themselves).
130. 28 Colo. 1, 62 P. 839 (1900).
131. Id. at 839-40.
132. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the court relied on Morgan v. King, 27
Colo. 203, 40 P. 499 (1900), which held a similar transaction voidable not void. Also the court
stated in the last line of the opinion that the contract was "void at the instance of the plaintiffs
(stockholders of Glengary), without regard to whether Ibex Company was guilty of any actual
fraud in obtaining it or not." 28 Colo. at 4, 62 P. at 84. A void contract is void ab initio
without it being at the instance of anyone. Clearly, the court was again relying on Morgan v.
King which had held that a transaction in question was voidable without regard to fairness,
good faith or fraud.
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4. Burden of Proving Fairness
If litigation should occur challenging a transaction between a corpora-
tion and one of its fiduciaries, the case law places additional burdens upon
fiduciaries by virtue of their trust relation to the corporation and its stock-
holder. It is almost universally agreed that transactions between directors or
dominant stockholders and their corporations are subject to rigid scrutiny by
the courts. 133 Furthermore, the evidential burden of proof, including the
burden of coming forward and the burden of persuasion, as to the good faith
of the transaction and its inherent fairness to the corporation and the stock-
holders is also placed upon the director or the majority shareholder. 134 In
the one case which discusses the quantum of proof necessary to establish
fairness, the court held that it must be proved by clear and convincing evi-
dence. 1
35
Once again, the leading case in this area is Pepper v. Litton, 136 which not
only established that majority stockholders are fiduciaries but also held that
they have the same burden of proof and close scrutiny placed upon their
transactions with the corporation as do the directors. In Pepper, the Supreme
Court developed the test by which the transaction should be judged:
Their [directors and dominant or controlling stockholders] dealings
with the corporation are subject to rigorous scrutiny and where any
of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is chal-
lenged the burden is on the director or stockholder not only to
prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent
fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested
therein .... 137
Furthermore, where a director or a stockholder is seen to exercise greater
control, as where he is a sole director or one of a small number of directors,
then a greater burden is placed upon, him to be candid and to show good
faith than where there are several directors involved. Hence, "[h]is acts [are]
subject to most severe scrutiny, and their validity determined by more rigid
principles of morality, and freedom from motives of selfishness."' 1 38
Colorado courts, as early as 1922, have consistently applied the princi-
133. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254
U.S. 590 (1921); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947); United Hotels Co. of
America v. Mealey, 147 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1945); Colorado Management Corp. v. American
Founders Life Ins. Co., 145 Colo. 413, 359 P.2d 665 (1961); Film Enterprises, Inc. v. Selected
Pictures, Inc., 138 Colo. 468, 335 P.2d 260 (1959); Chesapeake Constr. Corp. v. Rodman, 256
Md. 570, 261 A.2d 156 (1970); Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 48 N.J. 450, 226 A.2d 585
(1967).
134. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254
U.S. 590 (1921); Rosenthal v. Four Corners Oil & Minerals Co., 157 Colo. 136, 403 P.2d 762
(1965); Wilshire Oil Co. v. Rifle, 381 F.2d 646 (10th Cir. 1967); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp.,
162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1967); Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66
(1952); Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 48 N.J. 450, 226 A.2d 585 (1967).
135. Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 868 (3d Cir. 1968).
136. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
137. Id. at 306-07.
138. Id. at 307 n.14. See also Twin-Lick Oil Company v. Marbury, 91 U.S. at 590 (1876);
Schelensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Co., 166 N.E.2d 793 (Il1. 1960); Brundage v. New Jersey
Zinc Co., 226 A.2d 585 (1967).
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pie that when a director makes a contract with his corporation he has the
burden of showing that he acted in perfect good faith and that the contract
was fair to the corporation.' 39 Whenever a director enters into a contract
with his corporation or two corporations having common directors enter into
a contract, the transaction will be subject to rigid and close scrutiny by the
courts, and "[t]he burden is on the director, officer or agent to show the
validity of the contract and the fairness and honesty of his dealings with the
corporation, that he has gained no advantage therefrom, and that the corpo-
ration has not suffered thereby."' 40 The Colorado Supreme Court has
stated that such a rule "is deemed necessary to the end that in absence of
arm's length bargaining the scales may not be unfairly tipped to one side or
the other even through mistake or inadvertence."
14
1
Although there are no Colorado cases placing this additional burden on
dominant or majority stockholders, Colorado and Tenth Circuit cases clearly
establish that these additional burdens are concomitant with a fiduciary ob-
ligation. Since Colorado courts have held that a majority or dominant
stockholder is a fiduciary, it would be logical for the courts to unhesitatingly
extend this principle to controlling stockholders also. Finally, it should be
noted that the burden and scrutiny is not shifted or altered merely because a
director is dealing with a corporation which is represented by disinterested
directors or officers. The interested director still has the burden to show that
the transaction is fair, above board, entered in good faith, and free from
fraud. 142
Even by complying with modern statutes such as section 7-5-114.5,
which were specifically enacted to provide guidelines to validate these types
of transactions, the burden of proof will not shift because these statutes gen-
erally do not address that issue; therefore, it is still controlled by the equita-
ble and legal decisions of the courts. But, of course, in certain circumstances
stockholders and others interested in the transaction may lose their right to
sue through ratification and estoppel. Furthermore, if the interested director
is also a dominant or majority stockholder, or if the majority stockholder is
also interested in the transaction proposed, then ratification by a majority
(or whatever vote is necessary) of the stockholders will not change or shift the
burden of proof. In such a situation, the director or majority or dominant
stockholder will continue to bear the burden of proving the transaction is
fair and reasonable and lacking in fraud.'
4 3
Pappas v. Moss144 appears to be the leading case in this area. Pappas
involved the sale of treasury stock of the Hydromatics Company to all of the
members of the board of directors pursuant to a provision in its certificate of
139. Laybourn v. Wrape, 72 Colo. at 343, 211 P. at 369 (1922).
140. Rosenthal v. Four Corners Oil & Minerals Co., 157 Colo. at 143, 403 P.2d at 766
(1965). See also Film Enterprises, Inc. v. Selected Pictures, Inc., 138 Colo. 468, 335 P.2d 260
(1959).
141. Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 145 Colo. 413, 418,
359 P.2d 665, 668 (1961).
142. Id., 359 P.2d at 668.
143. Set, e.g., Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc
Co., 48 N.J. 450, 266 A.2d 585 (1961).
144. 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1908).
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incorporation which allowed such transactions to take place without share-
holder approval. Nevertheless, the directors, pursuant to a request by the
American Stock Exchange, asked for and received stockholder ratification of
this sale. The Third Circuit decided that pursuant to a New Jersey law, the
directors, absent stockholder approval, had the burden to show by clear and
convincing proof that the transaction was fair and honest and reasonable
and that this burden was not shifted because of the provision in the articles
of incorporation. Therefore, the court reasoned, the directors still had this
burden unless there had been an effective stockholder ratification in which
case the burden shifted and the stockholder challenging the transaction
would then have to prove that a fraud was perpetrated by the directors. In
this particular situation, the directors were also the majority stockholders of
the corporation and because of that fact the Third Circuit, again relying on
New Jersey law, held "that where .. .a majority of shares are held by those
'interested' in effectuating the [transaction] there can be no ratification, at
least in the sense that it transfers to the attacking party the burden of show-
ing fraud."'
45
The Third Circuit then remanded the case for a determination of
whether the directors who were also majority stockholders could establish by
clear and convincing evidence that the transaction had been honest, fair,
and reasonable. 146
There does appear to be some confusion, however, in whether the bur-
den shifts if a transaction between a corporation and a director who is a
controlling stockholder is ratified by a majority of the stockholders who are
disinterested in the transaction. 147 The better rule is that it would shift the
burden for that would be consistent with the principle that voidable acts of
directors are subject to ratification by the stockholders, which then makes
the transaction binding on the corporation. This type of ratification can
only be set aside by proof of actual fraud or bad faith, and the general rule is
that the person asserting the fraud must prove it.'
4 8
5. Test for Determining Fairness
While there is no inflexible rule or formula as to what constitutes fair-
ness, the test is an objective one, and the ultimate validity of a transaction
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case. The gen-
eral test of fairness in self-dealing transactions of corporate fiduciaries is
whether under all the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of
an arm's length bargain.1 49 In other words, if the transaction had been one
proposed by a stranger would an independent board of directors bind its
145. Id. at 868.
146. Id.
147. Compare Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 48 N.J. 450, 226 A.2d 585 (1961) with Grop-
per v. North Cent. Texas Oil Co., 35 Del. Ch. 198, 114 A.2d 231 (1955) and Pappas v. Moss, 393
F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968).
148. See Mountain States Packing Co. v. Curtis, 86 Colo. 355, 281 P. 737 (1929); Nye
Odorless Incinerator Corp. v. Felton, 35 Del. 236, 162 A. 504 (1931).
149. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. at 306-07 (1939). See aLso Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91
U.S. at 590 (1876).
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corporation to such a transaction. 150 The philosophy which makes this test
necessary was best stated by the United States Supreme Court as follows:
He who is in such a fiduciary position cannot serve himself first and
his cestuzs second. He cannot manipulate the affairs of his corpora-
tion to their detriment and in disregard of the standards of com-
mon decency and honesty. He cannot by the intervention of a
corporate entity violate the ancient precept against serving two
masters. He cannot by the use of the corporate device avail himself
of privileges normally permitted outsiders in a race of creditors.
He cannot utilize his inside information and his strategic position
for his own preferment. He cannot violate rules of fair play by
doing indirectly through the corporation what he could not do di-
rectly. He cannot use his power for his personal advantage and to
the detriment of the stockholders and creditors no matter how ab-
solute in terms that power may be and no matter how meticulous
he is to satisfy technical requirements. For that power is at all
times subject to the equitable limitation that it may not be exer-
cised for the aggrandizement, preference, or advantage of the
fiduciary to the exclusion or detriment of the cestuis. Where there is
a violation of those principles, equity will undo the wrong or inter-
vene to prevent its consummation.
15 1
There are, however, several more specific tests which can be used to
determine if the fiduciary has met his burden of proof: (1) the amount of
disclosure by the interested director; (2) whether there is fraud, actual or
constructive; and (3) if the transaction involves the purchase of corporation
assets, the amount paid by the directors for the assets as compared to their
fair market value and whether the fiduciary unduly profited in the transac-
tion. The fairness of the transaction will be judged in light of the facts and
circumstances at the time of its approval or ratification; it will not be judged
with the benefit of hindsight.
1 52
a. Requirement of full disclosure under Colorado law
Full disclosure is considered a test of fairness because it is required in
self-dealing transactions of directors or controlling shareholders by virtue of
the fiduciary nature of their relationship1 53 to the corporation. Without full
disclosure, the transaction itself is considered unfair.
154
By statute Colorado requires full disclosure of a director's personal in-
terest in a transaction to the independent directors or the stockholders in
150. H. HENN, supra note 14 at § 238.
151. Pepper v. Litton, 303 U.S. at 311 (1939) (footnote omitted).
152. Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1950); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch.
255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939); Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Joanna W. Mills Co., 53 Ill. App. 542, 368
N.E.2d 629 (1977).
153. Lembeck & Betz Eagle Brewery Co. v. McAnarey, 287 F. 927 (W.D.N.Y. 1923); State
v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 64 Wash. 2d 375, 391 P.2d 979 (1964). Ste generally 11 Scor TRUSTS
§ 170, 170.1; 14 Sco'rr TRUSTS § 216 (1957).
154. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2nd Cir. 1968); United Founders Life Ins.
Co. v. Consumers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 337 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1971); Remillard Brick Co. v.
Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, -, 241 P.2d 66, 74 (1952); Schelnsky v. South
Parkway Bldg. Co., 19 11. 2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793 (1960).
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order for the transaction not to be voidable because of his interest.155 The
case law in Colorado, however, broadens that requirement considerably.
Due to the fiduciary nature of the relationship, in order for a transaction
between a director and his corporation to be upheld when attacked, and
ultimately to be considered fair, there must be full and fair disclosure of all
the material facts and circumstances of the transaction.' 56 This principle
would logically be extended to dominant and controlling stockholders when
under the circumstances they are also held to be fiduciaries.
Like fairness, there is no formula for what constitutes full disclosure,
and hence it is normally determined on a case-by-case basis where the extent
of the disclosure will be judged within the context of all the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case. It is difficult to draw a conclusion as to what exactly
constitutes "full disclosure" for in the majority of cases dealing with disclo-
sure, the interested party, in order to secure ratification of a transaction
which he knows is questionable, discloses absolutely nothing, and of course
when the transaction is litigated the ratification is summarily held ineffec-
tive. Or, in the converse situation, there has been such a full disclosure of the
transaction that the issue is not even raised, or if it is, once again the court
deals with it in a summary fashion. Nevertheless, an examination of Colo-
rado case law will give an indication of what Colorado courts consider to be
"full disclosure" and "knowledge of the material facts."
In Hudson v. American Founders Life Insurance Co. 157 Hudson, a director
and the president of American Founders, was alleging that the stockholders
of his corporation had ratified his action of securing the issuance of 15,000
shares of the common stock of the corporation and exchanging that stock for
17,000 worthless shares of the ultimately insolvent Texas Adams Oil Corpo-
ration of which Hudson was also a director. Hudson had secured the issu-
ance of this stock without the approval of the board of directors. The court,
in holding that there had been no effective ratification, relied on the follow-
ing factors: (1) the resolution passed by the stockholders ratifying any legal
act taken by the board of directors did not, and in fact could not, ratify an
illegal invalid act such as the issuance of shares, and furthermore the resolu-
tion was passed before any discussion was entered into concerning the Texas
Adams stock; and (2) neither a balance sheet which read "Stock Owned
$47,600" nor Hudson's cryptic statement that the transaction was a stock
exchange and not a cash transaction in which he was taking full responsibil-
ity for the investment could amount under any doctrine to full and fair dis-
closure. 158 Furthermore, the Colorado Supreme Court required, in order to
have an effective ratification by the stockholders, that minutes of the stock-
holders' meeting reflect a discussion of the "specific" and "exact" details of
the transaction and that all the material facts concerning the controverted
155. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5(l)(a)(b) (Supp. 1976).
156. Rosenthal v. Four Corners Oil & Minerals Co., 157 Colo. at 142, 403 P.2d at 766
(1965); Swafford v. Berry, 152 Colo. at 498, 382 P.2d at 1002 (1963); Hudson v. American
Founders Life Ins. Co., 151 Colo. 54, 377 P.2d 391 (1963).
157. 151 Colo. 54, 377 P.2d 391 (1963).
158. Id. at 65-66, 377 P.2d at 397.
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transaction had been explained or discussed. 159
Swaford v. Berry160 held that in order to withstand later attack by a
stockholder, the transfer of a director's business with its assets to the direc-
tor's corporation in exchange for shares of the common stock of the corpora-
tion must be accompanied by "full and fair disclosure of the material facts to
those who are shareholders of the corporation at the time of the transaction"
and must not be attended by any unfairness or fraud. 16 1 In Swajbrd, within
the context of a closely held corporation, the verbal notification by the inter-
ested directors to the complaining stockholders, before purchase of the stock,
that they intended to transfer the assets of their business in exchange for
10,000 shares of the capital stock (valued at the time of the transfer at $10.00
a share) of the corporation coupled with the common knowledge within the
community, including the complaining stockholders, that this particular
business and its assets were worth in excess of $400,000 was complete disclo-
sure of the material facts of the transaction.1
62
Lastly, a director is not prohibited from making a reasonable profit in a
transaction with his corporation if full disclosure of the expected profit is
made to the corporation through disinterested directors or through the stock-
holders. ' 63 Corporate directors realizing "secret profits" in transactions with
their corporations are an anathema to the courts. Such profits will be con-
sidered a per se violation of the director's fiduciary duty not to gain an ad-
vantage at the expense of the corporation. Additionally, failure to disclose
the anticipated profit destroys any attempted ratification and renders the
transaction unfair. 
16 4
In summation, Colorado courts and statutes have specifically held that
in order for there to be full disclosure and a knowledgeable ratification there
must be (a) knowledge of the director's interest and all facts and circum-
stances surrounding the sale; (b) any profits expected to be realized by the
transaction must be reflected in the minutes; and (c) the exact and specific
details of the transaction must have been discussed so that the shareholders
knew all the material facts concerning the transaction.
b. Full disclosure as required byjuinsdictt'ns other than Colorado
The majority of other jurisdictions are in accord with Colorado law,
and they too require that in corporate transactions where a majority stock-
159. Id., 377 P.2d at 397.
160. 152 Colo. 493, 382 P.2d 999 (1963).
161. Id. at 498-99, 382 P.2d at 1002.
162. Other factors which influenced the court were that the complaining stockholders knew
what the assets of the business were, their actual cost in round figures, and the amount of time
and work the directors had expended in building up the business. Finally, in a directors' meet-
ing which took place subsequent to the transfer, the minutes reflected that the two complaining
stockholders felt that the $12.00 a share was too low a price based on the assets which the
corporation had received from the directors. Id. at 498, 382 P.2d at 1002.
163. Id., 382 P.2d at 1002.
164. Rosenthal v. Four Comers Oil & Mineral Co., 157 Colo. at 142, 403 P.2d at 766 (1965)
(Rosenthal as director of Four Comers failed to disclose that he was to receive as commission
40,000 shares of the 160,000 shares of Four Comers paid to another corporation in exchange for
mining claims owned by that corporation).
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holder or director has a personal interest, the director or controlling stock-
holder must make a full disclosure laying out "the truth without ambiguity
or reservation, in all of its stark significance" in order for the transaction to
be fair and the ratification to have a legal and binding effect.
t 65
One Seventh Circuit case, United Founders Life Insurance Co. v. Consumers
National Life Insurance Co.,166 does aid in determining what exactly consti-
tutes disclosure. In this transaction United owned 116,190 shares of Con-
sumers and contracted with another person and a corporation to buy more
stock in order to gain control of Consumers. United planned to eliminate
Consumers' board of directors and secure a merger of United and Consum-
ers. Directors of Consumers, in order to thwart a plan which would cost
them their jobs, decided that it was in the best interest of the corporation to
authorize 1,500,000 more shares of capital stock and to sell 280,000 of these
shares to a group of individuals in return for their promissory notes. After a
series of several more complicated machinations instituted by the directors of
Consumers in order to prevent a United takeover, litigation ensued between
the two corporations. United filed suit individually and derivatively against
Consumers asking the court to rescind the sale of the 280,000 shares, to en-
join the voting of the shares, and to grant damages. In order to settle the
litigation, a director, DaVoust, resigned from Consumers' board of directors
and then presented the plan that corporate assets of Consumers with a book
value of $1,473,000 be sold to D.P.C., Inc., a wholly-owned corporation of
DaVoust, for $1,160,000 cash. Further, DaVoust, through D.P.C., was given
an option to purchase 200,000 shares of the common stock of Consumers.
D.P.C. then was to sell the corporate assets to United (in order to prevent
United from showing a loss of $1,000,000 on the transfer) with payment be-
ing in the form of the 116,190 shares owned by United. In return United
agreed to rescind a stock purchase agreement whereby it was to gain control
of the corporation which in effect returned the stock to Consumers.
DaVoust, in another litigation seeking to hold the transaction invalid, was
accused of breaching his fiduciary duty to the corporation. 167
The Seventh Circuit upheld the transaction because an independent
board of directors had approved the settlement after full disclosure. Further-
more, the shareholders had received two notices about the proposed settle-
ment containing a full disclosure of the material facts. The notices
contained the following disclosures: (1) the settlement was promulgated by
DaVoust, former director and chairman of the board of Consumers; (2) the
assets were being transferred to D.P.C., Inc., "a corporation organized by
DaVoust"; (3) the issues in the three law suits and the terms of the proposed
settlement; (4) the assets were worth $1,973,072 and were being sold for
165. Breen Air Freight Ltd. v. Air Cargo, Inc., 470 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1972); Julien J. Sludey,
Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 282 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Raines v. Toney, 228 Ark. 1170, 313
S.W.2d. 802 (1958); United Homes, Inc. v. Moss, 154 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1963); Selensky v. South
Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Il1. 2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793; Levy v. Pacific E. Corp., 153 Misc. 488,
275 N.Y. 291 (1934); Poweroil Mfg. Co. Inc. v. Carstensen, 69 Wash. 673, 419 P.2d 793 (1966);
State v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 64 Wash. 375, 391 P.2d 979 (1964). S&egeneraly FLETcHER, supra
note 13, § 756 (lists 25 jurisdictions in accord with this principle).




$1,160,000; and (5) the difference between the purchase price and the sale
price was due to unearned interest on one of the mortgage assets of $161,556
which Consumers had the obligation to pay the purchaser of the mortgage
over a four year period and a recorded book loss of $151,516 on another
asset. The Seventh Circuit held that this notice was entirely adequate to
alert the cautious shareholder and his counsel that DaVoust was the central
party acquiring the United interest in Consumers and to outline the consid-
eration to be given and received by Consumers.
168
Finally, transactions litigated under the 1933 Securities and Exchange
Act 169 which requires full disclosure in connection with a purchase or sale of
stock further indicate what constitutes full disclosure.
Federal proxy rules promulgated under rule 14(a) of the Securities and
Exchange Act 170 require full disclosure of all material facts. "Material" is
another word which escapes easy definition. The most widely accepted defi-
nition was given in the landmark case of the Securities Exchange Commission v.
Texas Gulf Sulfur' 7 1 in which the Second Circuit stated:
The basic test of materiality . . . is whether a reasonable man
would attach importance [to a fact] . . . in determining his choice
of action in the transaction in question . . . . This, of course, en-
compasses any fact . . . which in reasonable and objective contem-
plation, might affect the value of the corporations stock or
securities. 17
2
Richland. Crandall,173 involved the sale of a construction corporation to
another corporation organized specifically to purchase it. Two of the direc-
tors of the selling corporation also had a substantial ownership interest in the
buying corporation, and a third director of the selling corporation agreed to
become an interim director and president of the buying corporation. The
court stated the general rule for determining if a material fact had been
omitted was whether, if disclosed, it would have influenced a reasonable
stockholder in voting on the proposal for the sale of the assets. The court
further stated that the general rule for determining if a statement made was
misleading was whether the claimed misstatement was of such a nature that
it could normally be expected to lead a reasonable stockholder to vote in
favor of the proposed sale.1
74
The court held that the proxy statement gave full and fair disclosure
based on the following findings: (1) it was proper to disclose the lengthy
discussion by the disinterested directors concerning the transaction and their
conclusion that it was fair based on an examination of past earnings of the
corporation, future prospects of the corporation, its competitive position, its
168. Id.
169. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78KK (1934).
170. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-I to a-12 (1979).
171. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
172. 401 F.2d at 868 (2d Cir. 1968). Accord, Northway Inc. v. T.S.C. Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d
324 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'don other grounds, 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (the test of whether omissions from
a proxy statement are material must include all facts which a reasonable stockholder might
consider important); Richland v. Crandall, 362 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
173. 362 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
174. Id. at 553.
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recent construction contract experience, and its assets and market history; (2)
it was not a material omission to omit the fact that the purchasers were
borrowing all of the funds necessary to finance the acquisition given the fact
that the loans were induced by personal guarantees of the wealthy purchas-
ers and a $2,000,000 security deposit; (3) it was proper to disclose the backlog
of construction contracts at their face value of $256,460,901, and it would
have been improper to speculate as to their ultimate worth as that would
have been misleading; (4) it was proper to disclose that the gross income of
the corporation had declined due to increased costs and intensified competi-
tion; (5) it was not an omission to fail to assign a dollar value to the goodwill
of the corporation as the nature of the business made such a designation
speculative; and (6) it was proper and necessary to disclose that the three
interested directors were not present at the meeting discussing the transac-
tion and their interest was properly and fully disclosed in a separate section
of the proxy statement which stated their respective interests, their positions
in the selling corporation, the fact that they had participated in the negotia-
tions, and all other material facts.'
7 5
Finally, it is important to note that in the cases dealing with this issue,
federal courts have held that nondisclosure in a purchase of a corporation's
assets by another corporation or a merger of two corporations of the fact that
the corporations had the same or common directors or officers was materi-
ally misleading and deceptive as a matter of law.
176
c. Transaction must be free offlaud
The second requirement in order for a transaction to be deemed fair is
that it must be free from fraud, actual or constructive.
Actual fraud in its general sense comprises anything calculated to
deceive, including all acts, omissions and concealments which breach a legal
or equitable duty, trust, or confidence and which result in an undue or un-
conscionable advantage being taken of another. Actual fraud, of course, in-
volves a knowing or intentional deception using any connivance, deception,
artifice, or concealment of material facts in order to cheat or deceive an-
other. It has been defined as any "concealment of a material fact which
should have been disclosed or the representation of the existence of a mate-
rial fact which did not exist. ' ' 1 77 Common law generally places the burden
of proving actual fraud on the party alleging it.
Within the context of corporate self-dealing, however, fraud is a loosely
used term and often used for transactions which do not fit within the term
"fraud" as it is traditionally used. Liability is often imposed for transactions
which constitute bad faith, breaches of fiduciary duty, acts constituting ac-
tionable negligence or gross unfairness, or acts which are truly oppressive to
175. Id. at 554-59.
176. Northway, Inc. v. T.S.C. Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975); Swanson v. Ameri-
can Consumers, Inc., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969), rev' 328 F. Supp. 797 (S.D. Il. 1971).
177. Premier Poultry Co., v. W. Burnstein & Son, Inc., 61 A.2d 632, 634 (Mun. Dist. App.
Dist. Col. 1948).
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the minority stockholder. 178 As to minority stockholders the general rule is
that "[w]here a majority of the directors or stockholder, or both, acting in
bad faith, carry into effect a scheme which, even if lawful upon its face, is
intended to circumvent the minority stockholders and defraud them out of
their legal rights, the courts interfere and remedy the wrong."'
179
Many times fraud need not be shown as a fact nor must it be shown
that the directors or stockholders were motivated by any fraudulent intent; it
is sufficient that the existence of fraud is the necessary legal inference from
the facts found. °80 It seems apparent, however, that actual fraud within this
context does involve some misrepresentation or omission of material facts to
the innocent stockholders, and therefore the issue of actual fraud is inextrica-
bly tied to the issue of full and fair disclosure. If there has been no inten-
tional concealment or misrepresentation concerning a transaction,
actionable actual fraud does not exist, but, of course, the transaction can still
be set aside as constructively fraudulent or unfair.' 8 1
Specifically what constitutes fraud is a question of fact, to be decided on
a case by case basis. However, it appears that the requisite elements for a
finding of actual fraud in the sale or purchase of corporate assets are as fol-
lows: (1) some type of misrepresentation or nondisclosure; (2) oppressive and
unfair tactics toward minority stockholders; and (3) less than adequate or
full consideration for the assets purchased.'
8 2
178. See generally W. FLETCHER, supra note 13, § 5829.
179. Flynn v. Brooklyn City Ry., 158 N.Y. 493, 507, 55 N.E. 520, 524 (1899).
180. See Whitten v. Dabney, 171 Cal. 621, 154 P. 312 (1915) (California court found fraud
present when the purchasers of all the stock in the corporation falsely represented to third per-
sons that said stock was treasury stock and that the proceeds of the sale would go into the
treasury and be used in developing the corporation's business when instead it was used to pay
unearned dividends in order to stimulate the sale of their own holdings); Gamble v. Queens
County Water Co., 123 N.Y. 91, 25 N.E. 201 (1890) (purchase of property from a stockholder by
a corporation at such an exorbitant price as to necessarily lead to the inference of fraud);
Humbaugh v. Hitchcock, 115 Kan. 182, 222 P. 114 (1924) (The court found fraudulent a trans-
action whereby a stockholder, who owned all of the preferred stock of a corporation, and a large
majority of the common stock, caused the preferred stock to be cancelled and in lieu thereof
caused to be issued to himself more common stock. This occurred at a meeting not attended by
the minority stockholders, and so they had no knowledge of the proposed transaction. The
transaction was found fraudulent without deciding the director's bad faith because it was
financially beneficial to the majority stockholder and a substantial disadvantage to the minor-
ity).
181. See, e.g., Levin v. Hunter, 6 Il. App. 2d 461, 128 N.E.2d 630 (1955). (There was no
proof of fraud where it was shown in an action by a stockholder to enjoin the execution of a ten-
year noncancellable management contract executed by the directors, that the question of the
contract had been fairly and openly discussed with the plaintiffs prior to the transaction).
182. The following cases do give an indication of what the courts will consider fraudulent
when a director/majority stockholder purchases the assets of his corporation.
In Kletin v. Independent Brewing Assoc. 231 111. 594, 83 N.E. 434 (1907), the court held fraudu-
lent a sale of property to the corporation (without disclosure to the stockholders) by the domi-
nant director at a price $16,575 in excess of the fair market value of the property.
One earlier case, Leopolda. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1942) involved the direc-
tors and 80% stockholders of the Inland Steamship Company, forcing the dissolution of that
profitable company over the objection of the minority stockholders, and then appropriating the
business and all its assets to their wholly-owned corporation which was held fraudulent for
several reasons. First the directors dissolved the corporation for their own personal interests and
not in the best interest of the minority stockholders. Second, they represented to the minority
stockholders that the business of the corporation would be discontinued when all along they
intended to appropriate said business to their own corporation. Third, inadequate consideration
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The second type of fraud, constructive, has long been applied in Colo-
rado for breach of fiduciary duty. 183 Constructive fraud is defined as being:
A breach of duty which, irrespective of moral guilt, the law de-
clares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive, violate confi-
dence or to injure public interests. Neither actual dishonesty nor
intent to deceive is an essential element of constructive fraud ....
Such fraud often arises where a special confidence or fiduciary rela-
tionship exists, which affords the power and the means of one to
take undue advantage over the other . . . . A breach of fiduciary
duty constitutes constructive fraud. Moreover constructive fraud,
like "[a] constructive trust is . . . [a] remedial device through
which preference of self is made subordinate to loyalty to
others."1
84
It is a doctrine which is designed to prevent the taking advantage of the
weakness or necessity of another. The conditions precedent to the applica-
tion of the doctrine are (1) an inequality between the parties; (2) a weakness
on one side and advantage taken of that weakness on the other; and (3) an
appearance that "the dominant party either brought about the uneveness in
the conditions, or finding it ready to his hand, utilized it and traded on it to
extract from the servient party a gift or contract he would not otherwise
have made."' 18 5 Where such a relationship is said to exist several presump-
tions are used to facilitate the finding of constructive fraud:
The law presumes in favor of the servient party against the domi-
nant party, (1) that the relation placed the dominant party in a
position to exercise influence and dominion over the servient party;
(2) that such influence and dominion operated upon, and pro-
cured, the transaction; and (3) that the influence was an improper
and unfair, or (to use the accepted phrase) an "undue influence."
was paid for the stockholders' interest, notwithstanding the fact that the directors had paid fair
market value for the assets, because the goodwill of the corporation and its history of substantial
profits were not taken into account when determining the value of the business. Finally, the
directors had forced the stockholders to accept the fair market value of the assets as representa-
tive of their stocks' worth by stating that the selling corporation had no business future without
the directors' corporation feeding business into it. Id. at 373-75.
A more blatant case of misrepresentation was Lembeck &Betz Brewing Co. v. McAnag, 287 F.
927 (W.D.N.Y. 1923), wherein a director and plant manager of a brewing plant caused the
directors of the corporation to sell the plant to him for an inadequate price by virtue of his
knowing misrepresentation as to the condition of the plant and the nature of its contents. The
directors had relied on the representations of the purchasing director as an accurate account of
the plant because they were too far from the plant to inspect it for themselves. Id. at 933.
Finally, in a more recent case, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals found a transaction fraud-
ulent where the director of a corporation (1) conspired to obtain 80% of the selling corporation's
stock; (2) formed a new company for the purpose of buying the assets and conducted the identi-
cal business previously conducted by the selling corporation; (3) excluded the minority stock-
holder from participating in the stock ownership of the new company; and (4) purchased the
assets at less than their fair market value. Massey v. Farnsworth, 353 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1962).
183. Whatley v. Wood, 157 Colo. 552, 404 P.2d 537 (1965); Dittbrenner v. Meyerson, 114
Colo. 448, 167 P.2d 15 (1946); Security Nat'l Bank v. Peters, Writer & Christensen, Inc., 39
Colo. App. 344, 569 P.2d 875 (1961). Seealso Irwin v. West End Dev. Co., 342 F. Supp. 687 (D.
Colo. 1972), a~fd, 481 F.2d 34 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1158 (1973).
184. Security Nat'l Bank v. Peters, Writer & Christensen, Inc., 39 Colo. App. at 351-52, 569
P.2d at 880-81 (1961).
185. Irwin v. West End Dev. Corp., 342 F. Supp. at 697 (D. Colo. 1972) (citing Dittbrenner
v. Meyerson, 114 Colo. at 458, 167 P.2d at 20 (1946)).
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When the relative position of the parties is such as prima facie to
raise this presumption, the transaction cannot stand unless the per-
son claiming the benefit of it is able to repel the presumption by
contrary evidence, proving it to have been in point of fact fair, just
and reasonable. '
8 6
Recent Colorado cases have held the following transactions to be con-
structively fraudulent and subject to rescission and award of damages: (a) a
director with the connivance of a personal secretary voted himself a retroac-
tive salary of $15,000 for operating a leasing business, to be paid from a loan
received by the corporation in order to build tennis courts where no resolu-
tion was passed to that effect and even though the director was entitled to
compensation for his services;' 87 (b) failure of directors to redeem preferred
stockholders' stock pursuant to liquidation because in order to do so would
require the sale of valuable corporate-owned stock which would increase in
value and thereby increase the amount the directors would receive for their
common stock was gambling with corporate property which should have
been used to redeem shares, which without informing the preferred stock-
holders, constituted a breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud;'
88
and, (c) a sale of corporate property for an inadequate consideration as mea-
sured against its fair market value.'
8 9
Inadequate consideration for corporate property, as well as being con-
structively fraudulent, is also, logically, considered unfair. The leading case
in this area is a United States Supreme Court decision, Geddes v. Anaconda
Copper Mining Co. 90 In this action a minority stockholder challenged the
sale of all the corporate property of the Alice Gold and Silver Mining Com-
pany to Anaconda Copper Company. The stockholder alleged, inter ah'a,
that the sale was voidable because the property was purchased for inade-
quate consideration and because the transaction was negotiated by two
boards of directors with common membership.
91
The lower court had found the consideration paid to be inadequate and
had the transaction set aside. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision by
saying:
The relation of directors to corporations is of such a fiduciary na-
ture that transactions between boards having common members
are regarded as jealously by the law as are personal dealings be-
tween a director and his corporation, and where the fairness of
such transactions is challenged the burden is upon those who
would maintain them to show their entire fairness and where a sale
is involved the full adequacy of the consideration. Especially is this
true where a common director is dominating in influence or in
186. 342 F. Supp. at 697 (D. Colo. 1972).
187. Id. at 687.
188. Security Nat'l Bank v. Peters, Writer & Christensen, Inc., 39 Colo. App. 344, 569 P.2d
875 (1961).
189. Whatley v. Wood, 157 Colo. 552, 404 P.2d 537 (1965).
190. 254 U.S. 590 (1921).
191. Id. Further, the driving force behind the sale, the president and director of the Alice
Corporation, was also a dominating director and general manager of the Anaconda Corpora-
tion, as well as being the dominating director of the corporation which owned and voted the
majority of the shares of the Alice Corporation.
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character. This court has been consistently emphatic in the appli-
cation of this rule, which, it has declared, is founded in soundest
morality, and we now add in the soundest business policy'
9 2
The court set aside the sale even though authorized by a majority of the
stockholders because the consideration was found to be inadequate.
Following this basic principle, courts will set aside, in self-dealing trans-
actions, sales or purchases of corporate property when the property received
by the corporation is worth less than what was paid or if the property sold by
the corporation is worth more than what the corporation received as consid-
eration. 193
There are, however, several tests used by the courts to determine if ade-
quate consideration has been paid: (1) a comparison of the fair market value
of the asset sold as of the date of the agreement or ratification (including
goodwill if an entire business is sold) with the amount paid by the director or
stockholder; 194 (2) expert testimony and appraisals as to the value of the
property; 195 and (3) what offers (or lack of offers) were received from third
parties wishing to buy the same corporate assets prior to their sale to the
directors or majority stockholders.
1 9 6
The purchase of corporate assets at their fair market value is not always
sufficient to protect a director or majority stockholder from liability for
breach of his fiduciary duty for the director has the duty to obtain the high-
est price possible for the corporate assets. For example, in Wheeler v. Abehine
National Bank Buildng, 19 7 a director, who was also president and majority
stockholder, of a corporation purchased the corporate assets at fair market
value. The court held the transaction voidable when it was established that
a third person had offered to buy the assets at a price $1,000 in excess of fair
market value. The court held that the director had breached his fiduciary
duty to make the property of the corporation produce the largest possible
amount.
This devolution of unlimited power imposes on a single holder of
majority of the stock a correlative duty, the duty of a fiduciary or
agent, to the holders of the minority of the stock, who can act only
192. Id. at 598.
193. Lembeck & Betz Eagle Brewing Co. v. McAnarney, 287 F. 927 (W.D.N.Y. 1923); Gott-
esman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Whatley v. Wood, 157 Colo.
152, 404 P.2d 537 (1965); Jordan v. Jordan Co., 94 Conn. 384, 109 A. 181 (1920); Schiff v. RKO
Pictures Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 329, 104 A.2d 267 (1954); Shelensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp.,
19 Ill. 2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793 (1960); Chesapeake Construction Corp. v. Rodman, 256 Md. 531,
261 A.2d 156 (1970).
194. See Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Richland
v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Garbino v. Albercan Oil Corp., 35 Del. Ch. 27,
109 A.2d 824 (1955); Scheff v. RKO Pictures Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 329, 104 A.2d 267 (1953).
195. Ste Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Whatley v. Wood, 157
Colo. 552, 404 P.2d 537 (1965) (expert testimony established that patented mining properties
which were sold by a director for $150 were worth $30,000 to $75,000); Abelow v. Midstates Oil
Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 145, 189 A.2d 675 (1958); Cottrell v. Pawcatuck Co., 36 Del. Ch. 169, 128
A.2d 225 (1957); Gropper v. North Cent. Tex. Oil Co., 35 Del. Ch. 198, 114 A.2d 231 (1955).
196. See Wheeler v. Abeline Nat'l Bank Bldg. Co., 159 F. 391 (8th Cir. 1908); Cardin Bldg.
Co. v. Smith, 125 Okla. 300, 258 P. 910 (1927); Williams v. Yocum, 37 Wyo. 432, 263 P. 607
(1928).
197. 159 F. 391 (8th Cir. 1908).
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through him, the duty to exercise good faith, care, and diligence
. . . to protect the interests of the holders of the minority of the
stock, and to secure and pay over to them their just proportion of
the income and of the proceeds of the corporate property. Any sale
of the property of the corporation by him to himself for less than he
could obtain for it from another, or any other act in his interest to
the detriment of the holders of the minority of the stock, becomes a
breach of duty and of trust, renders the sale or act voidable at the
election of the minority stockholders, and invokes plenary relief
from a court of chancery . . . . The reason for this rule is the detri-
ment to the holders of the minority of the stock from such sales and
transactions, and not the benefit the holder of the majority derives
therefrom. . . . It is the duty of the master of the corporation who
sells its property to procure the highest possible price for it . . . ,
and, if he sells it to himself for less, the sale is voidable by the hold-
ers of the minority of the stock at their option, although he paid the
fair market value for it. 198
Conversely, if the corporate property was valued at a certain amount
and failed to sell at that amount when placed on the market, it is not unfair
for a director and/or majority stockholder to purchase it for less than what
was thought to be the fair market value of the asset. 199
Expert testimony is frequently relied on by the courts to determine the
accurate value of the corporate asset sold. Courts rely heavily on those indi-
viduals who demonstrate the ability to accurately assess an asset's worth ei-
ther by professional expertise and reputation, long-time experience and
intimate knowledge of the corporation's balance sheet, or the use of sophisti-
cated accounting methods in order to determine an asset's worth.
2° °
Other factors used by the courts are (1) the extent of dominance of the
controlling stockholder purchasing the assets; (2) whether the transaction
constituted a better bargain than the corporation could have obtained in
dealings with others or a detriment to the corporation as a result of the trans-
action; (3) whether there was a possiblity of corporate gains being siphoned
off by the directors directly or through corporations they controlled; and (4)




Section 7-5-114.5 does not control all possible corporate conflict of inter-
est situations. One such transaction is when a controlling shareholder, who
is also deemed to be a fiduciary by virtue of his position of leadership within
198. Id. at 394.
199. Cardin Bldg. Co. v. Smith, 125 Okla. 300, 258 P. 910 (1927) (sale of the major asset of
a corporation, a building, to a director for $85,000 where it was allegedly worth $150,000 to
$200,000 was not unfair when it could be shown that the directors had placed the building on
the market at $104,000 and then $90,000 and had failed to receive a bid).
200. See Richland v. Crandall, 362 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Abelow v. Mid-States Oil
Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 145, 189 A.2d 675 (1958); Cottrell v. Pawcatuck Co., 36 Del. Ch. 169, 128
A.2d 225 (1957).
201. See Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. at 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Schelen-
sky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 11. 2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 703 (1960); Knudsen v. Burdett,
67 S.D. 20, 287 N.W. 673 (1939); Williams v. Yocum, 32 Wyo. 432, 263 P. 607 (1928).
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the corporation, contracts with his corporation so as to place himself in a
conflict of interest situation. In order to uphold such a transaction courts
demand that it be in good faith and scrupulously fair to the corporation and
the remaining stockholders. Further, compliance with the technical require-
ments of the statute cannot be in lieu of meeting the fairness requirement.
Clearly such a requirement is one of the simplest and, at the same time, one
of the most difficult to meet.

